# Asian Allies Aff

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### 1AC – Prolif [Short]

#### Allies in Asia perceive US as withdrawing from the region – declining assurance sparks prolif as a national security guarantee against China and North Korea

Crowley 16—Politico’s senior foreign affairs correspondent (Michael, “Obama's Asian nuclear nightmare,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/obama-nuke-223412>, dml)

Now, after the Iran deal averted what Obama predicted would be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Asia suddenly looms large as an atomic danger zone. Seemingly immune to sanctions and isolation, North Korea presses on with its weapons program: Recent satellite imagery suggests that North Korea may be building a new tunnel in preparation for its fifth nuclear test. Officials in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are losing patience with international efforts to thwart Pyongyang’s program. Some suspect China is all too happy with a status quo that keeps North Korea contained and stable. And those governments increasingly fret that the U.S., which has protected them for decades under a nuclear umbrella, may become a less reliable ally. The issue is particularly fraught in Japan, which has a post-World War II policy of pacifism enshrined in its constitution. But last year Japan passed legislation reinterpreting its constitution to allow foreign military operations for the first time since World War II, though only ones that are defensive in nature. Some officials and analysts say the anti-nuclear taboo is also being revisited, especially as China asserts new territorial claims, including over islands and waters claimed by Japan. At the same time, many Japanese leaders feel that Obama has not challenged Beijing forcefully enough. Trump’s suggestion that Japan and South Korea might need to fend for themselves has only exacerbated the concerns that America can no longer be relied on for protection. “Careless American rhetoric that calls into question America’s security commitment in general and extended nuclear deterrent in particular fuels Tokyo’s security planners to develop hedging strategies,” said Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. “It has often been thought that Japan has a bomb in the basement, and it would just have to assemble the parts to create a bomb,” Cronin added. “The technical challenges might actually be much greater than that, but it is the political hurdles that remain the real barriers to Japan acquiring nuclear weapons.” Those barriers, while still high, may be eroding. Shortly after Trump’s comments in March, for instance, the governor of Japan’s Osaka prefecture told reporters that the country should revisit the question of nuclear weapons. “What do we do if America’s military strength [in Japan] disappears?” asked the governor, Ichiro Matsui. “Wishful thinking doesn’t get us anywhere.” Other Japanese conservatives have made the same argument in recent years, including Shintaro Ishihara, who served as Tokyo’s governor until 2012 and said in 2011 that Japan “should absolutely possess nuclear weapons.” Such talk has been striking to Japan experts in the U.S., who have assumed for decades that the country would remain non-nuclear. “Very few except the extreme fringes used to talk about nuclear weapons” in Japan, said Richard Samuels, director of MIT’s Center for International Studies. Pro-nuclear weapons sentiment in Japan remains mostly on the far right, to be sure. But the same conversation is brewing in South Korea, where a 2013 poll found that two-thirds of South Koreans support developing nukes in response to its bellicose northern neighbor. “Seoul can no longer sit idly by as the [nuclear] talks lead to no results and Washington and Beijing are busy blaming each other for their diplomatic failures,” argued an editorial in Seoul’s conservative Chosun Ilbo newspaper earlier this year.

Such talk “is driven by a deep fear of abandonment” by the U.S., Cronin said.

#### Extended nuclear deterrence by the US is not credible –Obama flip flop and no delivery capability

Flores 14 citing Lyon and Pifer (Daniel Flores, A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE INTERSCHOOL HONORS PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, citing Rod Lyon, Fellow - International Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, also citing Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe as well as the Director of Brookings' Arms Control Initiative, June 2014, “The Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: The US Commitment to Japan”)

The security environment, as has been previously discussed in the relevant literature, of course brings its unique challenges. Lyon notes that the nature of the power distribution in the region further complicates matters. US extended deterrence in Europe during the Cold War was simple in the sense that it was bipolar and symmetric. There were two principle actors, the US and Soviet Union, who were relatively equal in power. In today’s Asia, it is more complicated; the power distribution is multipolar and asymmetric. The actors are various and disparate. Unlike the NATO alliance, US allies are not unified under a single bloc nor are their relations with each other always stable. China and North Korea, though allies, cannot be said to constitute a unified front either. These states are not equal in power. Their nuclear statuses in themselves demonstrate this, as China is a nuclear power, North Korea a budding nuclear power, and Japan and South Korea non-nuclear states. These factors contribute to make US calculations very complicated. They have several variables to consider and multiple relationships to balance. Lyon briefly describes some of the ways the United States affects assurance in Asia, focusing on the nuclear element. The apparent US commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons is naturally in conflict with its nuclear umbrella. The retirement of tactical and intermediate-range delivery systems is cause for concern among US allies. The terminology of US policy has shifted to some degree from “extended nuclear deterrence” to just “extended deterrence”, possibly signaling a reluctance on the part of the US to emphasize or use nuclear weapons in the defense of its allies. Pifer et al further elucidate the security environment.74 Also keeping the comparison to the NATO alliance in mind, they highlight the fact that nuclear weapons have never been available to the United States’ allies in East Asia as they were in Europe. 75 NATO allies maintain dual-use aircraft capable of delivering US nuclear weapons. The presence of nuclear weapons naturally enhances the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. Tactical weapons were once deployed in the Republic of Korea but were withdrawn during the administration of George H.W. Bush. The lack of nuclear weapons in Asia plus the retirement of some strategic delivery systems puts the US at a disadvantage when trying to bolster the credibility of nuclear assurance to its Asian allies.

#### Nuclear power is a prerequisite to prolif in East Asia – no technical barriers to nuclear weapons

Fitzpatrick 16 [Mark Fitzpatrick (Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme), "Asia’s Nuclear Arena: Hedging And Deterring," The Diplomat, 3/9/2016] AZ

Identify key forces and players impacting Northeast Asia’s nuclear arena.

Northeast Asia has seen the emergence of three nuclear-armed states. The USSR first tested an A-bomb in 1949, China in 1964 and North Korea in 2006. Each case was a surprise, and each posed a serious threat to Japan, in particular. Under political science theory, Tokyo thus had a repeated motivation to seek a nuclear equalizer, but it was always able to rely instead on the security guarantee provided by the United States. Ditto with Seoul, regarding the threat it faced from Pyongyang. In fact, South Korea sought nuclear weapons in the 1970s, as did Taiwan for two decades because of the existential threat from mainland China. The U.S. stopped both of them, using its alliance leverage and intelligence assets. Today, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are staunch adherents to the non-proliferation regime, but this stance rests heavily on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. Explain the strategic calculus of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as Asia’s latent nuclear powers and implications for Asia’s security architecture. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are latent nuclear powers in that their advanced nuclear energy programs and rocket technologies provide capabilities that could be applied to weapons development. If judged necessary for national survival, they could build nuclear weapons in perhaps two years – or less in Japan’s case because it already possesses uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. Beyond latency, Japan employs a quasi-hedging strategy, which is defined as latency with intent. In Japan’s case, the hedging is “quasi” because the nuclear capabilities were developed primarily for economic reasons. Nuclear hedging was a secondary purpose. Over the years, Japanese officials have often noted that the facilities provide a future weapons option, although saying so publicly was also a means of creating diplomatic leverage with the U.S. to encourage Washington to strengthen its security guarantees. Many South Koreans want the same reprocessing and enrichment capabilities for a sense of equality with Japan and to provide a nuclear hedge vis-à-vis North Korea. Taiwan is abandoning nuclear power altogether and no longer talks about a nuclear hedge. But it probably keeps blueprints for the old weapons facilities in a cupboard somewhere.

#### Asia prolif outweighs—multiple nuclear war scenarios

Kroenig 16—Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council (Matthew, “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future,” National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #58, June 2016, dml)

The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14

First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute.

In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis. Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China.

There is also the issue of “catalytic” war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less technologically developed states.

In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present.16 Although this was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used.

Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of the nuclear era.

#### Stability theory doesn’t apply to East Asia – lack of confidence building measures, live territorial disputes, underdeveloped security architectures, rising nationalism, and weak command and control undermines deterrence

Ogilvie-White 14 – Tanya, research fellow in the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Programme of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (funded by the Stanton Nuclear Security Fund) and a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, “The Urgent Need for Nuclear Risk Reduction in Asia,” August 2014, http://a-pln.org/sites/default/files/apln-analysis-docs/PB14.pdf

1. Claims that nuclear deterrence is inherently stable are less convincing today than previously. 2 Although decades of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear arms control negotiations have reduced the chances for deadly miscalculation and surprise in the US– Russia strategic relationship, 3 a similar depth of communication and understanding is missing in the bilateral relationships of most other nuclear-armed adversaries. This is especially troubling in Asia, where a dangerous combination of live territorial disputes, underdeveloped security architectures, political volatility, rising nationalism, nuclear and conventional arms racing, and weak command and control systems, mean that the potential for deterrence breakdown is real and growing.

### 1AC – Heg [Short]

#### Surge in nuclear energy challenges the NPT

Miller and Sagan 9 - Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security ("Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?" Journal Article, Daedalus, volume 138, issue 4, pages 7-18, <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/19850/nuclear_power_without_nuclear_proliferation.html>) RMT

This surge of interest in nuclear energy — labeled by some proponents as "the renaissance in nuclear power" — is, moreover, occurring simultaneously with mounting concern about the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the regulatory framework that constrains and governs the world's civil and military-related nuclear affairs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related institutions have been taxed by new worries, such as the growth in global terrorism, and have been painfully tested by protracted crises involving nuclear weapons proliferation in North Korea and potentially in Iran. (Indeed, some observers suspect that growing interest in nuclear power in some countries, especially in the Middle East, is not unrelated to Iran's uranium enrichment program and Tehran's movement closer to a nuclear weapons capability.) Confidence in the NPT regime seems to be eroding even as interest in nuclear power is expanding.

This realization raises crucial questions for the future of global security. Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.

On what will it depend? Unfortunately, the answer to that question is not so simple and clear, for the technical, economic, and political factors that will determine whether future generations will have more nuclear power without more nuclear proliferation are both exceedingly complex and interrelated. How rapidly and in which countries will new nuclear power plants be built? Will the future expansion of nuclear energy take place primarily in existing nuclear power states or will there be many new entrants to the field? Which countries will possess the facilities for enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium, technical capabilities that could be used to produce either nuclear fuel for reactors or the materials for nuclear bombs? How can physical protection of nuclear materials from terrorist organizations best be ensured? How can new entrants into nuclear power generation best maintain safety to prevent accidents? The answers to these questions will be critical determinants of the technological dimension of our nuclear future.

#### Asian prolif causes wildfire proliferation which collapses the NPT and crushes US credibility in Asia

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(David, and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf>)

Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both cases, the critical factor is perception. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing.6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11

#### NPT key to heg – global compliance strengthens perception of US primacy

Gibbons 16 [Rebecca Davis Gibbons (PhD candidate at Georgetown), "American Hegemony and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" Georgetown Dissertations, 4/15/2016] AZ

This project illustrated how commitment patterns within the nuclear nonproliferation regime differ from other multilateral treaty regimes. In the extant academic literature, domestic political factors are widely reported as the key variables for explaining variation in commitment for many treaty regimes, including those related to human rights, trade, and the environment. In contrast, for the nuclear nonproliferation regime the role of the hegemon is paramount for explaining commitment. The hegemon is the key factor in explaining how this regime works for three interrelated reasons: the regime was established by and continues to be promoted by the hegemon, the hegemon has a greater strategic interest in the regime’s success than all other states, and the regime is global. The first reason why this regime may be different than others is the fact that the hegemon established the regime initially and continues to have deep involvement in its perpetuation. Because of the hegemon’s role within the regime, all other states associate the regime with the hegemon’s leadership. This contrasts with other institutions in which a less powerful state or grouping of states established the treaty or regime. If the institutions are not founded by the hegemon, they are less likely to be perceived as part of the hegemonic global order and the mechanisms of hegemonic leadership are unlikely to apply. Other factors, such as domestic politics or regime type, would likely explain variation in commitment in these cases.

The second reason the hegemon matters to explaining variation in commitment with this regime is because of the difference in interests among the parties involved. The hegemon has a much greater strategic interest than other states in preventing additional nuclear weapons states around the globe and thus prioritizes this issue, as illustrated by the history of the regime. Moreover, the hundreds of federal workers at the U.S. State Department, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, and across the Intelligence Community, tasked in some way with addressing global proliferation illustrate this commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Many other states in the international system do not prioritize this issue on a global scale, and certainly not with commensurate resources to that of the United States. These states thus do not immediately seek to join new elements of the regime, and as a result, the hegemon must work to persuade them to commit. If all states cared about global nuclear nonproliferation as much as the hegemon, there would not be such variation in commitment and the hegemon would not need carrots and sticks to garner commitment. Though the majority of states do reap absolute gains (versus relative gains) from the success of the nonproliferation regime, the value of those absolute gains are not equal—they are much greater for the hegemon. In other institutions where states’ gains are more equal, other factors, especially those at the domestic level, are likely to explain variation in commitment.

The final reason why the mechanisms of commitment are different in this regime is because the hegemon seeks a truly global regime. Proliferation anywhere potentially weakens the aspirations of the hegemon. In regional institutions, the hegemon may be completely absent and then other factors would explain variation in states’ commitment. Interests are also less likely to be as divergent in regional institutions as they are in a global regime. For example, many regions around the globe now have Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, negotiated among the states in a particular geographic area. Because these institutions exist at the regional level, states are likely to perceive them as more relevant to their regional security than the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and mechanisms of commitment will be less likely to stem from the hegemon than regional and domestic influences.

#### More broadly, the non-proliferation regime is the lynchpin of hegemony

Gavin 15 [Francis Gavin (first Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies and Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," International Security, Summer 2015] AZ

* influence allies and deter enemies
* miscalc 🡪 war
* entangles US in unwanted conflicts
* tipping points 🡪 nuclear cascade

The objective of the United States' strategies of inhibition was and remains simple: to prevent other states—regardless of their political affiliation or orientation—from developing or acquiring independent nuclear forces, and when this effort fails, to reverse or mitigate the consequences of proliferation. Across different administrations and changing international circumstances, the United States has shown itself willing to pay a very high price to achieve these ends. When it is unable to stop proliferation, it works hard to prevent the proliferator from undertaking policies—weaponization, pursuit of a missile capability, and especially nuclear testing—that would increase the pressure on other states to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States is also more willing to countenance nuclear weapons programs, such as Great Britain's, that become dependent on and are coordinated with U.S. nuclear systems.33

Why has the United States been so interested in preventing states from possessing independent nuclear forces? Many international relations scholars argue that the spread of nuclear weapons can stabilize world politics.34 Nuclear weapons, they contend, have little effectiveness for anything but deterrence.35 These analysts are often perplexed by or critical of U.S. efforts to halt nuclear proliferation, and wonder if policymakers understand how nuclear deterrence works. Even those analysts who do not support nuclear proliferation are puzzled by the high price of strategies the United States has employed to prevent it.

These scholars miss a fundamental point: historically, U.S. policymakers have demonstrated less enthusiasm than the conventional wisdom suggests for the supposedly stabilizing aspects of nuclear weapons for international relations. Of far greater concern has been the worry over how other countries might use nuclear weapons against the United States. The strategies of inhibition were developed to stem the power-equalizing effects of nuclear weapons and have been motivated by the desire of the United States to safeguard its security and preserve its dominant power. As U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out, “It was almost in the nature of nuclear weapons that if someone had them, he did not want others to have them.”36

There are seven interrelated elements driving the United States' strategies of inhibition. They are motivated by the goal to protect the United States from nuclear attack and/or the desire to maintain U.S. freedom of action to pursue other strategic goals.

First, the United States has feared nuclear weapons being used against it, either through a deliberate nuclear attack or an accidental launch. The higher the number of states that possess nuclear weapons, the greater the risk the United States might be hit. Given the horrific consequences of an attack, American decisionmakers have considered it their responsibility to decrease this danger by limiting proliferation and its consequences. As U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, it was “frightening to think of a world where anybody could have a bomb.”37

Second, given the difficulty of identifying where a nuclear attack may have originated, U.S. policymakers worry about the catalytic or “detonator” consequences of proliferation; in other words, they fear that an independent nuclear state might threaten to use or actually employ a nuclear weapon to draw the United States into a conflict in which it did not want to become involved.38 There is evidence that Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, and possibly France pursued nuclear strategies aimed at pulling an otherwise unwilling United States into crises on their behalf.39 A 1962 top-secret study explained this fear: the “Nth country problem” might generate “the danger of major war being ‘catalyzed,’ deliberately or inadvertently, by the possessors of nuclear weapons outside the control of the major alliances.”40

Third, the United States has worried about the emergence of nuclear tipping points or nuclear dominoes, whereby one key state acquiring a nuclear capability might lead four or five other states to do the same.41 After the People's Republic of China tested a nuclear device in 1964, for example, President Lyndon Johnson's Committee on Nuclear Proliferation (also known as the Gilpatric Committee) warned: “The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.”42 Not only would “proliferation cascades” increase the number of nuclear states in the world, with all the dangers that this could bring; it could also increase tensions and dangers in parts of the world the United States has considered important. Furthermore, it could drive U.S. allies—for example, Japan and South Korea—to target each other in ways inimical to the United States' interests.43

Fourth, U.S. policymakers have fully appreciated the power of nuclear deterrence, but have feared that nuclear weapons could be used to deter the United States and limit its freedom of action, both regionally and in the world at large.44 From the beginning of the nuclear age, the United States recognized the potential for nuclear weapons to become the great equalizer, “weapons of the weak,” allowing states with far inferior conventional, economic, and other forms of power to prevent it from doing what it wants. In the words of the Gilpatric Committee report, “As additional nations obtained nuclear weapons, our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war.”45 And as Michael Horowitz explains, a feeble state “possessing even a single nuclear weapon influences America's strategic calculations and seems to make coercive success harder.”46

Fifth, it is easier to control allies that do not have their own nuclear weapons and that depend on the United States for their security. The United States has bristled at the independent policies that nuclear-armed allies such as France and Israel have pursued, often against its wishes. A Germany, Taiwan, Japan, or South Korea with nuclear weapons might be more likely to challenge the regional or international status quo with threats or the use of force in ways inimical to U.S. interests. President John F. Kennedy, for example, warned that if U.S. allies acquired nuclear weapons, “they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in.”47

Sixth, U.S. policymakers have feared that otherwise weak adversaries might become emboldened to act aggressively if they acquired nuclear weapons.48 And given the nature of nuclear weapons—where the absolute number a state possesses may be less important than its willingness to use them—small nuclear-armed states might even try to coerce the United States during a crisis.49 As Secretary of State Dulles lamented to his Soviet counterpart, “A dictator could use the bombs to blackmail the rest of the world.”50 And in 1962, a government report suggested that “[c]oping with the possessors of a small, extortionate deterrent force will require the mastery of some new political-military techniques.”51 Finally, containing nuclear states is far more expensive than containing nonnuclear states.52

Seventh, although dozens of states could potentially build a nuclear weapon, U.S. policymakers remain concerned that only great powers possess the economic, technological, and bureaucratic capacities to build robust command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities and to keep their weapons safe and secure.53 This concern matters for two reasons. First, small and weak nuclear states could disintegrate and lose control of their weapons, including to substate actors and terrorists.54 As Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen revealed about Pakistan's nuclear program, “I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern.”55 Second, the United States might be forced to politically support—against its other interests—otherwise problematic, weak nuclear states to forestall the dangers their instability might bring. When the Cold War ended, for example, the United States decided not to encourage the breakup of the Soviet Union—the preferred geostrategic choice of the George H.W. Bush administration—because of fears over nuclear security, safety, and proliferation. As President Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, lamented, administration officials “decided they would prefer to see weapons in the hands of just one entity, which had the stability and experience to secure them.”56

As the greatest power in the international system seeking to maintain its security and pursue its freedom of action in the world, the United States found these challenges intolerable. The strategies of inhibition were natural, if difficult, costly, and often destabilizing, responses. For all of these reasons, the purportedly peace-inducing qualities of nuclear weapons typically took a back seat to American policymakers' fears about the effect of nuclear proliferation on U.S. national interests. The United States worked hard to inhibit the spread of independent nuclear weapons programs and mitigate the consequences of proliferation when it could not be stopped.2

#### US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### 1AC – Plan

#### The Republic of Taiwan, the People's Republic of Japan, and the Republic of South Korea ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.

#### The risk of prolif in Asia is high and growing – states have the capability to weaponize and there are no checks

White 14 [Tanya Ogilvie-White (research director at the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University), Nobumasa Akiyama, Chang-Hoon Shin, Shahriman Lockman and Manpreet Sethi, "Why nuclear dangers should galvanise Asian leadership at the Hague Summit," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 3/20/2014] AZ

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop is heading to the Netherlands for next week’s Nuclear Security Summit. Although Australia has earned a reputation for taking the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism very seriously and for implementing stringent preventive measures (see, for example here and here), the same is not true of all governments in the Asia-Pacific. In this multi-national op-ed, scholars from across Asia point out that nuclear dangers are growing in our region, that weak links need to be addressed, and that it’s time for Asian leaders to come together and show leadership in the Summit process.

It’s no secret that nuclear dangers are mounting in Asia. Nuclear weapons arsenals are growing, nuclear power programs are expanding, and fissile and radioactive materials—which could be used to target innocents anywhere—are used, stored and transported throughout our region, sometimes in insecure conditions. It’s a discomfiting picture, and contrary to what skeptics would have us believe, it’s not an exaggerated one. We should be putting pressure on our political leaders to accept their responsibility to address our concerns before a nuclear catastrophe occurs.

Next week, an opportunity exists for them to be pro-active in the face of nuclear dangers as leaders from around the world gather in the Netherlands at the world’s third Nuclear Security Summit to discuss and agree on actions that should be taken to reduce nuclear risks across the globe. So, what are these risks?

Let’s travel across the Asian nuclear landscape with our eyes wide open. First stop: Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state with the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal and military stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu). It’s believed that there are elements who are sympathetic to extremist groups among its military, and a number of terrorist organisations operating from its soil. The risks of nuclear sabotage and theft at Pakistan’s military and civilian sites mustn’t be underestimated.

Heading south to India, the nuclear landscape is marginally better. New Delhi too is in the process of building its credible deterrence and the stockpile of weapons-usable HEU and Pu is growing. India also has an ambitious nuclear power programme with twenty-one nuclear power reactors already operational, more being built, and a new reprocessing facility at Kalpakkam. Physical and material security at the increasing numbers of sites must be of the highest standard, given that threats could emerge from within the country or across the border.

Onward to China, where the nuclear arsenal may be growing more slowly (creeping up from 240 to an estimated 250 nuclear warheads since the 1980s) but where a massive expansion of nuclear energy is underway. Currently, 17 nuclear reactors are operational, more than 25 are under construction, and several more are planned by 2020. Indeed, China has by far the most ambitious nuclear power programme in the world. While countries in Asia have a rationale for expanding nuclear energy to meet their rising electricity needs, the demands that this imposes on nuclear security mustn’t be taken lightly.

Across the border, the Korean peninsula is another nuclear hot spot. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and reports that it’s continuing to operate its reactors, combined with complete opacity in how the nuclear material and facilities are being secured, and doubts over the state of the regime, raise worrying scenarios. Moreover, although the nuclear landscape in South Korea is currently benign from a weapons point of view, its nuclear energy program is certainly ambitious, raising the same nuclear security concerns as elsewhere.

Our next stop, Japan, is scarred by the events triggered by the earthquake and tsunami three years ago. There aren’t any nuclear weapons here, but Japan is home to a stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium and the largest quantity of civilian HEU in Asia. It’s fair to say that nuclear vulnerabilities abound. Indeed, the Fukushima crisis exposed a culture of complacency in the management of nuclear energy and a misplaced public confidence that’s yet to be re-established.

Countries in Southeast Asia must also be a part of our itinerary since many are contemplating nuclear programs. Currently, public safety concerns are restraining plans for nuclear power, but even so, Vietnam intends to build and operate more than 10 nuclear reactors by 2030. In time, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines may follow a similar path.

The reality for the world, not just for Asia, is that nuclear weapons and nuclear energy will be part of our lives for the foreseeable future, with all the risks that this entails. Of course, civilian applications of nuclear technology have many benefits for humanity, but acknowledging that fact shouldn’t tempt us to downplay the dangers.

Our political leaders need to open their eyes to this and accept responsibility for it. We hope they’ll candidly discuss concrete ways of strengthening capacity to secure nuclear materials across our region. For that, confidence and security building is essential. Despite the difficult political climate, there’s no option but to cooperate, to prevent Asia from becoming an epicentre of another nuclear catastrophe. Each state, whether it’s a nuclear weapon state or not, should make extraordinary efforts to increase national accountability for their nuclear programs according to accepted international benchmarks.

### 1AC – Heg [Long]

#### Surge in nuclear energy challenges the NPT

Miller and Sagan 9 - Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security ("Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?" Journal Article, Daedalus, volume 138, issue 4, pages 7-18, <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/19850/nuclear_power_without_nuclear_proliferation.html>) RMT

This surge of interest in nuclear energy — labeled by some proponents as "the renaissance in nuclear power" — is, moreover, occurring simultaneously with mounting concern about the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the regulatory framework that constrains and governs the world's civil and military-related nuclear affairs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related institutions have been taxed by new worries, such as the growth in global terrorism, and have been painfully tested by protracted crises involving nuclear weapons proliferation in North Korea and potentially in Iran. (Indeed, some observers suspect that growing interest in nuclear power in some countries, especially in the Middle East, is not unrelated to Iran's uranium enrichment program and Tehran's movement closer to a nuclear weapons capability.) Confidence in the NPT regime seems to be eroding even as interest in nuclear power is expanding.

This realization raises crucial questions for the future of global security. Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.

On what will it depend? Unfortunately, the answer to that question is not so simple and clear, for the technical, economic, and political factors that will determine whether future generations will have more nuclear power without more nuclear proliferation are both exceedingly complex and interrelated. How rapidly and in which countries will new nuclear power plants be built? Will the future expansion of nuclear energy take place primarily in existing nuclear power states or will there be many new entrants to the field? Which countries will possess the facilities for enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium, technical capabilities that could be used to produce either nuclear fuel for reactors or the materials for nuclear bombs? How can physical protection of nuclear materials from terrorist organizations best be ensured? How can new entrants into nuclear power generation best maintain safety to prevent accidents? The answers to these questions will be critical determinants of the technological dimension of our nuclear future.

#### Asian prolif causes wildfire proliferation which collapses the NPT and crushes US credibility in Asia

Santoro, senior fellow @ Pacific Forum CSIS, 15

(David, and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf>)

Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both cases, the critical factor is perception. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing.6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11

#### Scenario One is Asian credibility.

#### Asian security cred is an impact filter and is key to overall heg

Ochmanek, 15—Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation (David, “Sustaining U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Region”, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE142/RAND_PE142.pdf>, dml)

One hundred years ago, Europe plunged into war while the United States stood aloof, only to decide later that it had to engage. Seventy years ago, following another period of U.S. disengagement, the most destructive and widespread conflict the world has known was at its peak. Since that time, U.S. foreign and security policies have been predicated on the conviction that U.S. interests are best served when the United States plays the leading role in organizing efforts to deter aggression and promote stability in regions of the world where it has important interests at stake. This approach has not always been wisely or consistently applied, and it has not allowed Americans to avoid the scourge of armed conflict entirely. But the strategy of active engagement and leadership, supported by military capabilities second to none, has helped the world avoid large-scale war between major powers and has coincided with an era of unprecedented prosperity for Americans and many of their allies and partners. While this record of success does not argue definitively for the continuation of a strategy of engagement and leadership, it does, at a minimum, place the burden of proof on those who would argue for a radical change in approach.

The costs and burdens of leadership are often more tangible than the benefits. This is particularly true when U.S. forces have been engaged in protracted and frustrating combat operations abroad, when challenges arise that call for another exercise of U.S. military power, or when fiscal pressures compel trade-offs in spending between programs to promote domestic well-being and national security. But there are strong reasons to believe that a strategy centered on continued U.S. leadership remains both desirable and feasible. From the standpoint of its military dimension, which is the primary focus of this perspective, there are particular reasons for optimism:

• The United States remains the security partner of choice for many of the world’s most important states. This is due as much to the important and enduring shared interests as it is to the prowess of U.S. military forces. Our potential adversaries, for the most part, lack meaningful alliance relationships. And when they act more forcefully to assert their prerogatives, these adversaries strengthen further the bonds between the United States and its allies and partners.

• Modern, large-scale combat operations are complex undertakings, and war is an inherently chaotic enterprise. As much as potential adversary states have studied U.S. combat operations since Desert Storm, they understand that they lag far behind the forces of the United States in both real-world experience with this sort of thing and large-scale, realistic training for it. This gap enhances deterrence and will be hard for others to close.

• Although U.S. defense budgets will likely be tightly constrained for some years to come, they will still, in absolute terms, exceed those of our nearest competitors (China and Russia) by substantial margins for many years to come. And if the administration and Congress can summon the political will to do so, they can find major efficiencies in DoD’s budget through such steps as closing unneeded bases; cutting headquarters and other overhead operations; and reducing the rate of growth of the military and civilian compensation, including military health care costs.21

• China, Russia, and other potential adversaries are confronting constraints of their own on their future economic growth and national power. A short list of these challenges includes looming demographic imbalances, severe environmental degradation, and the contradictions between authoritarian forms of governance and populations with access to greater material resources and outside sources of information. These realities argue against both making long-term linear extrapolations of Chinese power and the notion that the United States will confront the challenge of a rising and potentially antagonistic China indefinitely.

Just as Mark Twain has been (mis)quoted as saying, “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated,” it would be highly premature (and strategically risky) to decide that the United States, working with its closest allies and partners, is no longer up to the challenge of defending important common interests in regions far from its shores or that the benefits of maintaining credible power projection capabilities in support of such a strategy are outweighed by the costs. Developing and deploying the capabilities needed for direct defense will enhance deterrence and, if deterrence fails, will improve U.S. prospects to protect U.S. and allied interests in conflict. Clarity about our capabilities and intentions will reduce the prospects of miscalculation by the Chinese or others. While many other steps can be taken to reduce the risks of conflict between the United States and potential adversaries (e.g., improved mechanisms for dispute resolution and crisis management), clarity about the U.S. commitment to direct defense and a visible investment in the requisite capabilities are essential. The ideas offered here suggest the main elements of a way forward for U.S. and allied defense planners.

#### Scenario Two is the NPT

#### NPT key to heg – global compliance strengthens perception of US primacy

Gibbons 16 [Rebecca Davis Gibbons (PhD candidate at Georgetown), "American Hegemony and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" Georgetown Dissertations, 4/15/2016] AZ

This project illustrated how commitment patterns within the nuclear nonproliferation regime differ from other multilateral treaty regimes. In the extant academic literature, domestic political factors are widely reported as the key variables for explaining variation in commitment for many treaty regimes, including those related to human rights, trade, and the environment. In contrast, for the nuclear nonproliferation regime the role of the hegemon is paramount for explaining commitment. The hegemon is the key factor in explaining how this regime works for three interrelated reasons: the regime was established by and continues to be promoted by the hegemon, the hegemon has a greater strategic interest in the regime’s success than all other states, and the regime is global. The first reason why this regime may be different than others is the fact that the hegemon established the regime initially and continues to have deep involvement in its perpetuation. Because of the hegemon’s role within the regime, all other states associate the regime with the hegemon’s leadership. This contrasts with other institutions in which a less powerful state or grouping of states established the treaty or regime. If the institutions are not founded by the hegemon, they are less likely to be perceived as part of the hegemonic global order and the mechanisms of hegemonic leadership are unlikely to apply. Other factors, such as domestic politics or regime type, would likely explain variation in commitment in these cases.

The second reason the hegemon matters to explaining variation in commitment with this regime is because of the difference in interests among the parties involved. The hegemon has a much greater strategic interest than other states in preventing additional nuclear weapons states around the globe and thus prioritizes this issue, as illustrated by the history of the regime. Moreover, the hundreds of federal workers at the U.S. State Department, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, and across the Intelligence Community, tasked in some way with addressing global proliferation illustrate this commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Many other states in the international system do not prioritize this issue on a global scale, and certainly not with commensurate resources to that of the United States. These states thus do not immediately seek to join new elements of the regime, and as a result, the hegemon must work to persuade them to commit. If all states cared about global nuclear nonproliferation as much as the hegemon, there would not be such variation in commitment and the hegemon would not need carrots and sticks to garner commitment. Though the majority of states do reap absolute gains (versus relative gains) from the success of the nonproliferation regime, the value of those absolute gains are not equal—they are much greater for the hegemon. In other institutions where states’ gains are more equal, other factors, especially those at the domestic level, are likely to explain variation in commitment.

The final reason why the mechanisms of commitment are different in this regime is because the hegemon seeks a truly global regime. Proliferation anywhere potentially weakens the aspirations of the hegemon. In regional institutions, the hegemon may be completely absent and then other factors would explain variation in states’ commitment. Interests are also less likely to be as divergent in regional institutions as they are in a global regime. For example, many regions around the globe now have Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, negotiated among the states in a particular geographic area. Because these institutions exist at the regional level, states are likely to perceive them as more relevant to their regional security than the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and mechanisms of commitment will be less likely to stem from the hegemon than regional and domestic influences.

#### More broadly, the non-proliferation regime is the lynchpin of hegemony

Gavin 15 [Francis Gavin (first Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies and Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," International Security, Summer 2015] AZ

* influence allies and deter enemies
* miscalc 🡪 war
* entangles US in unwanted conflicts
* tipping points 🡪 nuclear cascade

The objective of the United States' strategies of inhibition was and remains simple: to prevent other states—regardless of their political affiliation or orientation—from developing or acquiring independent nuclear forces, and when this effort fails, to reverse or mitigate the consequences of proliferation. Across different administrations and changing international circumstances, the United States has shown itself willing to pay a very high price to achieve these ends. When it is unable to stop proliferation, it works hard to prevent the proliferator from undertaking policies—weaponization, pursuit of a missile capability, and especially nuclear testing—that would increase the pressure on other states to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States is also more willing to countenance nuclear weapons programs, such as Great Britain's, that become dependent on and are coordinated with U.S. nuclear systems.33

Why has the United States been so interested in preventing states from possessing independent nuclear forces? Many international relations scholars argue that the spread of nuclear weapons can stabilize world politics.34 Nuclear weapons, they contend, have little effectiveness for anything but deterrence.35 These analysts are often perplexed by or critical of U.S. efforts to halt nuclear proliferation, and wonder if policymakers understand how nuclear deterrence works. Even those analysts who do not support nuclear proliferation are puzzled by the high price of strategies the United States has employed to prevent it.

These scholars miss a fundamental point: historically, U.S. policymakers have demonstrated less enthusiasm than the conventional wisdom suggests for the supposedly stabilizing aspects of nuclear weapons for international relations. Of far greater concern has been the worry over how other countries might use nuclear weapons against the United States. The strategies of inhibition were developed to stem the power-equalizing effects of nuclear weapons and have been motivated by the desire of the United States to safeguard its security and preserve its dominant power. As U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out, “It was almost in the nature of nuclear weapons that if someone had them, he did not want others to have them.”36

There are seven interrelated elements driving the United States' strategies of inhibition. They are motivated by the goal to protect the United States from nuclear attack and/or the desire to maintain U.S. freedom of action to pursue other strategic goals.

First, the United States has feared nuclear weapons being used against it, either through a deliberate nuclear attack or an accidental launch. The higher the number of states that possess nuclear weapons, the greater the risk the United States might be hit. Given the horrific consequences of an attack, American decisionmakers have considered it their responsibility to decrease this danger by limiting proliferation and its consequences. As U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, it was “frightening to think of a world where anybody could have a bomb.”37

Second, given the difficulty of identifying where a nuclear attack may have originated, U.S. policymakers worry about the catalytic or “detonator” consequences of proliferation; in other words, they fear that an independent nuclear state might threaten to use or actually employ a nuclear weapon to draw the United States into a conflict in which it did not want to become involved.38 There is evidence that Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, and possibly France pursued nuclear strategies aimed at pulling an otherwise unwilling United States into crises on their behalf.39 A 1962 top-secret study explained this fear: the “Nth country problem” might generate “the danger of major war being ‘catalyzed,’ deliberately or inadvertently, by the possessors of nuclear weapons outside the control of the major alliances.”40

Third, the United States has worried about the emergence of nuclear tipping points or nuclear dominoes, whereby one key state acquiring a nuclear capability might lead four or five other states to do the same.41 After the People's Republic of China tested a nuclear device in 1964, for example, President Lyndon Johnson's Committee on Nuclear Proliferation (also known as the Gilpatric Committee) warned: “The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.”42 Not only would “proliferation cascades” increase the number of nuclear states in the world, with all the dangers that this could bring; it could also increase tensions and dangers in parts of the world the United States has considered important. Furthermore, it could drive U.S. allies—for example, Japan and South Korea—to target each other in ways inimical to the United States' interests.43

Fourth, U.S. policymakers have fully appreciated the power of nuclear deterrence, but have feared that nuclear weapons could be used to deter the United States and limit its freedom of action, both regionally and in the world at large.44 From the beginning of the nuclear age, the United States recognized the potential for nuclear weapons to become the great equalizer, “weapons of the weak,” allowing states with far inferior conventional, economic, and other forms of power to prevent it from doing what it wants. In the words of the Gilpatric Committee report, “As additional nations obtained nuclear weapons, our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war.”45 And as Michael Horowitz explains, a feeble state “possessing even a single nuclear weapon influences America's strategic calculations and seems to make coercive success harder.”46

Fifth, it is easier to control allies that do not have their own nuclear weapons and that depend on the United States for their security. The United States has bristled at the independent policies that nuclear-armed allies such as France and Israel have pursued, often against its wishes. A Germany, Taiwan, Japan, or South Korea with nuclear weapons might be more likely to challenge the regional or international status quo with threats or the use of force in ways inimical to U.S. interests. President John F. Kennedy, for example, warned that if U.S. allies acquired nuclear weapons, “they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in.”47

Sixth, U.S. policymakers have feared that otherwise weak adversaries might become emboldened to act aggressively if they acquired nuclear weapons.48 And given the nature of nuclear weapons—where the absolute number a state possesses may be less important than its willingness to use them—small nuclear-armed states might even try to coerce the United States during a crisis.49 As Secretary of State Dulles lamented to his Soviet counterpart, “A dictator could use the bombs to blackmail the rest of the world.”50 And in 1962, a government report suggested that “[c]oping with the possessors of a small, extortionate deterrent force will require the mastery of some new political-military techniques.”51 Finally, containing nuclear states is far more expensive than containing nonnuclear states.52

Seventh, although dozens of states could potentially build a nuclear weapon, U.S. policymakers remain concerned that only great powers possess the economic, technological, and bureaucratic capacities to build robust command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities and to keep their weapons safe and secure.53 This concern matters for two reasons. First, small and weak nuclear states could disintegrate and lose control of their weapons, including to substate actors and terrorists.54 As Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen revealed about Pakistan's nuclear program, “I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern.”55 Second, the United States might be forced to politically support—against its other interests—otherwise problematic, weak nuclear states to forestall the dangers their instability might bring. When the Cold War ended, for example, the United States decided not to encourage the breakup of the Soviet Union—the preferred geostrategic choice of the George H.W. Bush administration—because of fears over nuclear security, safety, and proliferation. As President Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, lamented, administration officials “decided they would prefer to see weapons in the hands of just one entity, which had the stability and experience to secure them.”56

As the greatest power in the international system seeking to maintain its security and pursue its freedom of action in the world, the United States found these challenges intolerable. The strategies of inhibition were natural, if difficult, costly, and often destabilizing, responses. For all of these reasons, the purportedly peace-inducing qualities of nuclear weapons typically took a back seat to American policymakers' fears about the effect of nuclear proliferation on U.S. national interests. The United States worked hard to inhibit the spread of independent nuclear weapons programs and mitigate the consequences of proliferation when it could not be stopped.2

#### US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### 1AC – Prolif [Long]

#### Assurance is low—triggers prolif

Crowley, 16—Politico’s senior foreign affairs correspondent (Michael, “Obama's Asian nuclear nightmare,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/obama-nuke-223412>, dml)

Now, after the Iran deal averted what Obama predicted would be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Asia suddenly looms large as an atomic danger zone. Seemingly immune to sanctions and isolation, North Korea presses on with its weapons program: Recent satellite imagery suggests that North Korea may be building a new tunnel in preparation for its fifth nuclear test.

Officials in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are losing patience with international efforts to thwart Pyongyang’s program. Some suspect China is all too happy with a status quo that keeps North Korea contained and stable.

And those governments increasingly fret that the U.S., which has protected them for decades under a nuclear umbrella, may become a less reliable ally.

The issue is particularly fraught in Japan, which has a post-World War II policy of pacifism enshrined in its constitution. But last year Japan passed legislation reinterpreting its constitution to allow foreign military operations for the first time since World War II, though only ones that are defensive in nature.

Some officials and analysts say the anti-nuclear taboo is also being revisited, especially as China asserts new territorial claims, including over islands and waters claimed by Japan. At the same time, many Japanese leaders feel that Obama has not challenged Beijing forcefully enough. Trump’s suggestion that Japan and South Korea might need to fend for themselves has only exacerbated the concerns that America can no longer be relied on for protection.

“Careless American rhetoric that calls into question America’s security commitment in general and extended nuclear deterrent in particular fuels Tokyo’s security planners to develop hedging strategies,” said Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.

“It has often been thought that Japan has a bomb in the basement, and it would just have to assemble the parts to create a bomb,” Cronin added. “The technical challenges might actually be much greater than that, but it is the political hurdles that remain the real barriers to Japan acquiring nuclear weapons.”

Those barriers, while still high, may be eroding.

Shortly after Trump’s comments in March, for instance, the governor of Japan’s Osaka prefecture told reporters that the country should revisit the question of nuclear weapons.

“What do we do if America’s military strength [in Japan] disappears?” asked the governor, Ichiro Matsui. “Wishful thinking doesn’t get us anywhere.”

Other Japanese conservatives have made the same argument in recent years, including Shintaro Ishihara, who served as Tokyo’s governor until 2012 and said in 2011 that Japan “should absolutely possess nuclear weapons.”

Such talk has been striking to Japan experts in the U.S., who have assumed for decades that the country would remain non-nuclear. “Very few except the extreme fringes used to talk about nuclear weapons” in Japan, said Richard Samuels, director of MIT’s Center for International Studies.

Pro-nuclear weapons sentiment in Japan remains mostly on the far right, to be sure. But the same conversation is brewing in South Korea, where a 2013 poll found that two-thirds of South Koreans support developing nukes in response to its bellicose northern neighbor.

“Seoul can no longer sit idly by as the [nuclear] talks lead to no results and Washington and Beijing are busy blaming each other for their diplomatic failures,” argued an editorial in Seoul’s conservative Chosun Ilbo newspaper earlier this year.

Such talk “is driven by a deep fear of abandonment” by the U.S., Cronin said.

#### Nuclear power is a prerequisite to prolif in East Asia – no technical barriers to nuclear weapons

Fitzpatrick 16 [Mark Fitzpatrick (Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme), "Asia’s Nuclear Arena: Hedging And Deterring," The Diplomat, 3/9/2016] AZ

Identify key forces and players impacting Northeast Asia’s nuclear arena.

Northeast Asia has seen the emergence of three nuclear-armed states. The USSR first tested an A-bomb in 1949, China in 1964 and North Korea in 2006. Each case was a surprise, and each posed a serious threat to Japan, in particular. Under political science theory, Tokyo thus had a repeated motivation to seek a nuclear equalizer, but it was always able to rely instead on the security guarantee provided by the United States. Ditto with Seoul, regarding the threat it faced from Pyongyang. In fact, South Korea sought nuclear weapons in the 1970s, as did Taiwan for two decades because of the existential threat from mainland China. The U.S. stopped both of them, using its alliance leverage and intelligence assets. Today, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are staunch adherents to the non-proliferation regime, but this stance rests heavily on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. Explain the strategic calculus of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as Asia’s latent nuclear powers and implications for Asia’s security architecture. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are latent nuclear powers in that their advanced nuclear energy programs and rocket technologies provide capabilities that could be applied to weapons development. If judged necessary for national survival, they could build nuclear weapons in perhaps two years – or less in Japan’s case because it already possesses uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. Beyond latency, Japan employs a quasi-hedging strategy, which is defined as latency with intent. In Japan’s case, the hedging is “quasi” because the nuclear capabilities were developed primarily for economic reasons. Nuclear hedging was a secondary purpose. Over the years, Japanese officials have often noted that the facilities provide a future weapons option, although saying so publicly was also a means of creating diplomatic leverage with the U.S. to encourage Washington to strengthen its security guarantees. Many South Koreans want the same reprocessing and enrichment capabilities for a sense of equality with Japan and to provide a nuclear hedge vis-à-vis North Korea. Taiwan is abandoning nuclear power altogether and no longer talks about a nuclear hedge. But it probably keeps blueprints for the old weapons facilities in a cupboard somewhere.

#### Proliferation overwhelms incentives for civilian use of nuclear reactors

Li and Yim 13- Mang-Sung Yim is in the Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and Jun Li works at UNC Chapel Hill (“Examining relationship between nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power development” Progress in Nuclear Energy Volume 66, July 2013, Pages 108–114<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149197013000504>) RMT

This paper attempts to examine the relationship between nuclear weapons proliferation and civilian nuclear power development based on the history of Atoms for Peace Initiative. To investigate the relationship, a database was established by compiling information on a country's civilian nuclear power development and various national capabilities and situational factors. The results of correlation analysis indicated that the initial motivation to develop civilian nuclear power could be mostly dual purpose. However, for a civilian nuclear power program to be ultimately successful, the study finds the role of nuclear nonproliferation very important. The analysis indicated that the presence of nuclear weapons in a country and serious interest in nuclear weapons have a negative effect on the civilian nuclear power program. The study showed the importance of state level commitment to nuclear nonproliferation for the success of civilian nuclear power development. NPT ratification and IAEA safeguards were very important factors in the success of civilian nuclear power development. In addition, for a country's civilian nuclear power development to be successful, the country needs to possess strong economic capability and be well connected to the world economic market through international trade. Mature level of democracy and presence of nuclear technological capabilities were also found to be important for the success of civilian nuclear power program.

#### Asian assurance is on the brink—minor shifts in political allegiance shatter the overall security umbrella—causes a nuclear prolif snowball

Santoro and Warden, 15—senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS AND WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS (David and John, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” The Washington Quarterly • 38:1 pp. 147–165, dml)

The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing.6

Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7

In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail.

North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9

U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system.

Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11

Initial Steps to Assure Japan and South Korea

The United States has a variety of military and political tools at its disposal to assure Japan and South Korea. Because the requirements of assurance and extended deterrence overlap, actions designed to strengthen extended deterrence, such as modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and public declarations of will, also strengthen assurance as long as their effects are relayed to allies. Yet, these steps will not be sufficient. Assurance has to be tailored to the needs of each ally and include dialogue, consultations, joint planning, and improved relations beyond the military area.

#### Asia prolif outweighs—multiple nuclear war scenarios

--fire emoji

Kroenig, 16—Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council (Matthew, “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future,” National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #58, June 2016, dml)

The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14

First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute.

In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis. Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China.

There is also the issue of “catalytic” war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less technologically developed states.

In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present.16 Although this was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used.

Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of the nuclear era.

#### Accidents are likely and go global – outweighs intentional wars

Hayes 15 (Peter, Executive Director for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, “Ending Nuclear Threat via a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone,” <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/ending-a-nuclear-threat-via-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/>)

Deterrence, compellence, and reassurance are credible depending on the resolve and capability of the state projecting nuclear threat, and the ability of the threatened state to respond in kind or asymmetrically, to offset these threats. All three types of effects are almost always present in a nuclear threat made by one party to another; sometimes all three effects may be in play at the same time, either in the intention of the state projecting nuclear threat, or in the perception of the state that is the target of the threat, or in the perceptions of third parties. It is rare for the intentions and perceptions of these two or more affected states to be the same. Therein lies much of the risk of misperception, misunderstanding, and inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This risk arising from miscalculation is compounded by the accidental risks of nuclear war because of technical or computer malfunctions, misinterpreted signals of an impending attack, problems in communication systems, problems in fail-safe and control systems, and cybernetic organizational feedbacks that could lead to loss-of-control of conventional and nuclear forces. 3. Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia All states in the Northeast Asia region fall under the shadow of the threat of nuclear war. Sometimes, this threat is intended, manipulated, and calibrated, by a variety of signals—nuclear testing, delivery system testing, visible transiting deployments, forward deployment in host countries, declaratory doctrines, operational doctrines, political statements, propaganda statements, sharing via deliberate open line communications, or even what is not done or said at a particularly tense moment. Nuclear threat is one of the bases of interstate relations between the long-standing NWSs in this region, the United States, China, and Russia, forming a triangle of strategic nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance that operates continuously and generally; and sometimes becomes part of an immediate confrontation. Accordingly, these types of threat are termed general and immediate in western literature.[3] Thus, general and strategic nuclear deterrence may be said to operate to ensure that NWSs avoid actions that might suggest that they could involve nuclear weapons and intentions to use them—thereby creating a cautionary behavior that operates all the time.

#### Nuke deterrence doesn't check– short-flight times increases miscalc

Cimbala 15 – Stephen J., Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, “New Nuclear Disorder : Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy” Ashgate Publishing Ltd

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle Mast with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable- force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is £ desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.2" The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle Mast with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or lighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially "strategic" effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle 1 Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" and its encouragement of information-based warfare." Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete. The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.\*1 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made- several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence- theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states' nuclear forces are second strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take- comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the "first nuclear age" roughly corresponding to the Cold War.1' Pessimists who predicted that some 30 01 more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Hurope. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union—especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second strike capability and the deterrence "rationality" according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war elsewhere.2'' In addition, powers favoring nuclear containment in general may- fall short of disagreement in specific political cases. As Patrick M. Morgan has noted, there is "insufficient agreement among states on how serious it (nuclear proliferation) is and on what to do about it."2

## Prolif

### U – Nuke Power Up

#### Asia is in nuclear renaissance

Vivoda 13 [Vlado Vivoda (Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University), "After Fukushima: the future of nuclear power in Asia," East Asia Forum, 3/13/2013] AZ

Some analysts suggested that Asia’s nuclear renaissance was over while others remained cautiously optimistic about the region’s nuclear power future. But nearly two years after the Fukushima disaster, plans for nuclear power in Asia remain mostly in place.

With increasing competition for oil and gas among Asian nations and the negative impact of carbon pollution, nuclear power is still considered by many regional states as a matter of survival, both in terms of growing energy demands and environmental security.

But in Japan, not surprisingly, the future of nuclear power is still unclear. Before the disaster, Japan generated 25–30 per cent of its electrical power from 54 nuclear reactors, and planned to increase capacity to 50 per cent by 2030. By that time it was planned that 14 new reactors would have entered operation. Twelve of them were under construction or active development in early 2011.

Long one of the world’s most committed promoters of civilian nuclear power, the 3/11 disaster has changed attitudes in Japan. Many Japanese blame the government for allowing the accident to happen and are strongly in favour of abandoning nuclear power. Many of Japan’s plants have been closed, or their operation suspended for safety inspections. While the last of Japan’s 54 reactors went offline for maintenance in May 2012, leaving Japan completely without nuclear-produced electrical power for the first time since 1966, in July 2012 two reactors in the Ōi Nuclear Power Plant were restarted to tackle anticipated electricity shortages during summer peaks.

While output from other nuclear power plants are now expected to resume at some stage in the near to medium term, the long-term forecast for nuclear power production in Japan is that it will be considerably lower than pre-3/11. Few, if any, of the proposed nuclear plants are expected to enter service, and many of the existing plants may never be restarted due to safety concerns or public opposition. While the public overwhelmingly supports a phase-out by 2040 — and in mid-September the government hinted that this may be the preferred policy option — Japan’s powerful ‘nuclear village’ and the current government are strongly opposed to a phase-out. Consequently, the future role of nuclear power in Japan’s energy mix is yet to be determined and subject to debate.

China hosts the world’s largest nuclear development program. On top of 16 existing nuclear reactors, 26 are under construction and a further 51 reactors are firmly planned. In the immediate term, the State Council responded to the 3/11 disaster by suspending the approval of further nuclear power projects until new safety plans were in place, and requiring checks on operational, under-construction and approved reactors. The suspension of unapproved projects has not had an immediate impact on China’s nuclear program, given the number of projects already approved and under construction. In addition, Beijing has moved closer to ending its suspension after unveiling a plan to upgrade security standards at nuclear facilities by 2015. A recently released five-year nuclear safety plan has prompted another round of speculation that Beijing may resume its ambitious nuclear expansion plans in the near future. Consequently, the Fukushima disaster is unlikely to have a long-term impact on China’s nuclear growth.

India has 20 nuclear reactors in operation in six nuclear power plants, while seven other reactors are under construction. The Indian government responded to 3/11 in near record time, with officials saying within a week that its nuclear program had been recently reviewed and was safe. The government’s message is that it’s business as usual for nuclear power. New Delhi’s stance is unsurprising in a country where power demand is surging and national electrification and grid integration programs are incomplete. Having passed the Indo–US nuclear agreement in 2008 (effectively ending a 34-year US ban on supplying nuclear technology and fuel to India), and clearing the way for Australian uranium exports to India, New Delhi’s plans to increase its nuclear capacity are moving faster than ever.

But since 3/11 populations around proposed Indian nuclear plant sites have launched protests, raising questions about atomic energy as a clean and safe alternative to fossil fuels. The state government of West Bengal has even refused permission to a proposed facility intended to host six Russian reactors. A Public Interest Litigation has also been filed against the government’s civil nuclear program at the Supreme Court. Yet much of the opposition relates to local land and employment issues, and issues related to imported (as opposed to indigenous) reactors, rather than to more general concerns about nuclear safety. The rate at which nuclear power expands in India will depend on how these issues are resolved.

South Korea has 23 nuclear reactors that produce around 30 per cent of the country’s electricity, and has plans to increase that share to 60 per cent by 2035. Eleven reactors are scheduled to come on stream between 2012 and 2021. In addition, Korea is seeking to export its nuclear technology, and aims to sell 80 reactors abroad by 2030. Korean enterprises are among those hoping to pick up overseas contracts at the expense of Japanese companies, and are pursuing opportunities in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Indonesia, India, China and Malaysia. Although in December 2011 protesters demonstrated in Seoul and other areas after the government announced it had picked sites for two new plants, internal opposition to the country’s domestic nuclear program is relatively small.

Taiwan has six operating nuclear reactors and two advanced reactors under construction. While comprehensive safety reviews have found no concerns, nuclear energy has emerged as a contentious issue. In March 2011, anti-nuclear protesters were demonstrating for an immediate halt to the construction of the island’s fourth nuclear power plant, and there are now calls for a referendum on its future. The protesters were also opposed to plans to extend the lifespan of three existing nuclear plants. In November 2011, the government acceded to their requests, and two existing reactors are expected to close in 2016.

Indonesia has plans for four nuclear-power plants by 2024. With growing electricity shortages, Indonesia is unlikely to halt its plan to build its first nuclear-power plant. It claims its plants will be safe, thanks to the use of more advanced technology than the four-decade-old Fukushima reactors. Elsewhere in Asia, Thailand froze its plans to build nuclear plants after 3/11 but reversed course in late 2011, concerned over continuously increasing electricity demands. Under its current 20-year plan, Thailand will have four or five plants operational by 2030. Vietnam, presently nuclear-free, has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with a range of countries and in early 2012 announced a partnership with Russia that includes a US$9 billion deal to construct 13 nuclear plants by 2020. Finally, Malaysia and Bangladesh each plan to build two nuclear reactors, by 2022 and 2018 respectively.

In Europe, the Fukushima catastrophe has reshaped the nuclear landscape, decimating industries in Germany, Italy and Switzerland — countries that share good safety records and negligible seismic risk. But in much of Asia, the aftershocks have been muted. Major regional nuclear powers, China, India and South Korea, have reaffirmed their nuclear programs, albeit with caveats and plans to review safety measures and emergency procedures. Other countries, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Bangladesh, remain committed to developing nuclear power largely as a means to tackle electricity shortages.

While there has been increased local and environmentalist opposition to nuclear power in most Asian countries, it has not been sufficient to reshape government policies that promote nuclear power. The only exceptions are Japan and Taiwan, where the jury is still out on the future role of nuclear power, although gradual phase-outs are the most likely option.

### ! – Accidents

#### Accidents are likely and go global – outweighs intentional wars

Hayes 15 (Peter, Executive Director for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, “Ending Nuclear Threat via a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone,” <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/ending-a-nuclear-threat-via-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/>)

Deterrence, compellence, and reassurance are credible depending on the resolve and capability of the state projecting nuclear threat, and the ability of the threatened state to respond in kind or asymmetrically, to offset these threats. All three types of effects are almost always present in a nuclear threat made by one party to another; sometimes all three effects may be in play at the same time, either in the intention of the state projecting nuclear threat, or in the perception of the state that is the target of the threat, or in the perceptions of third parties. It is rare for the intentions and perceptions of these two or more affected states to be the same. Therein lies much of the risk of misperception, misunderstanding, and inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This risk arising from miscalculation is compounded by the accidental risks of nuclear war because of technical or computer malfunctions, misinterpreted signals of an impending attack, problems in communication systems, problems in fail-safe and control systems, and cybernetic organizational feedbacks that could lead to loss-of-control of conventional and nuclear forces. 3. Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia All states in the Northeast Asia region fall under the shadow of the threat of nuclear war. Sometimes, this threat is intended, manipulated, and calibrated, by a variety of signals—nuclear testing, delivery system testing, visible transiting deployments, forward deployment in host countries, declaratory doctrines, operational doctrines, political statements, propaganda statements, sharing via deliberate open line communications, or even what is not done or said at a particularly tense moment. Nuclear threat is one of the bases of interstate relations between the long-standing NWSs in this region, the United States, China, and Russia, forming a triangle of strategic nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance that operates continuously and generally; and sometimes becomes part of an immediate confrontation. Accordingly, these types of threat are termed general and immediate in western literature.[3] Thus, general and strategic nuclear deterrence may be said to operate to ensure that NWSs avoid actions that might suggest that they could involve nuclear weapons and intentions to use them—thereby creating a cautionary behavior that operates all the time.

### ! – Arms Race

#### Asian prolif sparks an arms race and accidental nuke war

Cimbala 14 — Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, B.A. in Journalism from Penn State in 1965, M.A.in 1967 and his Ph.D. in 1969 both in Political Science, from the University of Wisconsin, Madison,has consulted for a number of U.S. government agencies and defense contractors, 2014("Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects", Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March, Available Online at <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/MASA6-1Eng%20(4)_Cimbala.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 24-5, aqp)

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a “strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling” without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear tests.

A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch, by rogue commanders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

#### East Asian arms race causes nuclear war

Richardson 13 (Michael, journalist who writes for multiple major newspapers with a focus on Japan, “deterring an asia nuke race,” a.d. 6.15..15, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/08/commentary/world-commentary/deterring-an-asia-nuke-race/#.VX9ftkaPWy0,je)

Without mutual restraint in Asia, other regional countries with civilian nuclear reactor experience and the necessary resources and skills could also decide to protect themselves by developing their own nuclear arms. Such potential “threshold” countries include South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, a driving force for a nuclear threat reduction group of security specialists and former senior officials from 18 countries, cautions that when “a large and growing number of nuclear-armed adversaries confront multiple perceived threats, the risk that deterrence will fail and that nuclear weapons will be used rises dramatically.” Another prominent member of the group, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, says that there is only a short time left to pull back from the edge of a nuclear precipice. “Asia is an important backdrop for this discussion, as a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens regional stability and could spark a new wave of proliferation,” he warns. Their comments follow a recent call by U.S. President Barack Obama for America and Russia to open new arms control talks to further cut their deployed long-range nuclear arms by as much as one-third. The last bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by Moscow and Washington in 2010, requires each nation by 2018 to cap its stockpile of fielded nuclear warheads at 1,550. So under Obama’s proposal, a new ceiling could become approximately 1,000 deployed strategic warheads apiece. Under the current START pact, the two former Cold War adversaries also agreed to limit fielded nuclear delivery vehicles, including bombers and missiles based on land and at sea, to 700, with an additional 100 allowed in reserve. But the START deal does not cover all nuclear warheads or delivery systems, only those classed as long range. Nor does it encompass all nuclear armed states, although at least 90 per cent of atomic arms belong to the U.S. and Russia. The SIPRI report estimates that at the start of 2013, eight of the nine nuclear armed nations had approximately 4,400 operational atomic weapons, with nearly 2,000 “in a state of high operational alert.” North Korea was assessed to have perhaps six or eight nuclear bombs, none of them operational. This evidently means they cannot yet be made small enough to be carried by North Korean missiles or bombers. SIPRI said that if all the nuclear warheads held by the nine nations with atomic weapons were counted, the total would amount to approximately 17,270 nuclear weapons, with a variety of short-, medium- as well as long-range delivery systems. The total warhead count includes spares, those in both active and inactive storage, and intact warheads set to be dismantled, as well as operational warheads. Obama also called for the reduction of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons in Europe. These have never been officially counted or limited by any international treaty. One reason Russia gives for being reluctant to negotiate further bilateral nuclear cuts with the U.S. is that some other nuclear-armed countries are strengthening their warhead and missile capabilities. This is an evident reference to China among others, even though Moscow and Beijing have formed a “strategic partnership” to oppose U.S. and Western domination. China’s position is that the U.S. and Russia have the overwhelming majority of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, meaning those capable of traveling intercontinental distances and causing massive destruction. So Washington and Moscow should continue to make “drastic” cuts in their stockpiles in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Cheng Jingye, China’s top envoy to a U.N. nuclear nonproliferation conference, said last year that once this was done, “other nuclear-weapon states, when conditions are ripe, should also join the multinational negotiations on nuclear disarmament.” But when might that be? One of the concerns of U.S. critics of Obama’s latest proposals is that China could use any extended new round of START negotiations that involve only America and Russia to enlarge and modernize its own nuclear arsenal in secret. Some U.S. analysts say that this is already happening. The critics argue that if the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals keep dropping, China might be able to achieve numerical parity, or near-parity, quite quickly with the today’s two dominant nuclear powers. Nonnuclear Asian states, such as South Korea and Japan, look to their ally, the U.S., to protect them from nuclear attack under Washington’s extended deterrence policy. If U.S. nuclear strength and resolve appears to be weakening, they might become so alarmed at the heightened nuclear threats they face, whether from North Korea or China, that they would make their own dash for atomic arms.

#### Asian arms race leads to extinction

Adams 14 (Shar Adams, writer for Epoch Times, citing Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defense and security expert at the Australian National University, October 13, 2014. “Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in North-East Asia Bigger Threat Than War on Terror.” http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/1014683-asian-cold-war-escalating-conflict-in-north-east-asia-bigger-threat-than-war-on-terror/)

The world may be focused on the “war on terror”, but the arms build up in North-East Asia **poses a far greater threat to global stability**, says Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defence and security expert at the Australian National University (ANU). A former head of ANU’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Professor Ball is no lightweight when it comes to security concerns. It is Professor Ball’s expertise in command and control systems, particularly in relation to nuclear war, that underlies his concerns about North-East Asia. “North-East Asia has now become the **most disturbing part of the globe**,” Prof Ball told Epoch Times in an exclusive interview. **China, Japan and South Korea** – countries that are “**economic engines of the global economy**” – are embroiled in an **arms race of unprecedented proportions**, punctuated by “very dangerous military activities”, he says. Unlike the arms race seen during the Cold War, however, there are **no mechanisms in place to constrain the military escalation** in Asia. “Indeed, the **escalation dynamic** could **move very rapidly and strongly to large scale conflict**, including **nuclear conflict**,” said Prof Ball. “It is happening as we watch.” Arms Race Military spending in Asia has grown steadily over the last decade. According to a 2013 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report, China is now the world’s second largest military spender behind the United States, spending an estimated $188 billion in 2013. Japan and South Korea are also among the world’s top 10 military spenders. When North Korea and Taiwan are included, North-East Asian countries constitute around 85 per cent of military spending in Asia. But what is more disturbing, Prof Ball says, is the motivation for the acquisitions. “The primary reason now for the acquisitions, whether they are air warfare destroyers, missiles or defense submarines, is simply to match what the other [countries] are getting,” he said. While he believes it is likely that Japan would have embarked on military modernisation, he says it is China’s military provocation of countries across Asia that is fuelling the build-up. Since China lay claim to all of the South China Sea, it has escalated territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. What started with skirmishes between locals and Chinese fishing boats or navy vessels has now become territorial grabs – island building on contested rocky outcrops. In a sign of things to come, the South China Morning Post reported in June: “China is looking to expand its biggest installation in the Spratly Islands into a fully formed artificial island, complete with airstrip and sea port, to better project its military strength in the South China Sea.” According to Filipino media, the artificial island falls within the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Prof Ball says China’s behaviour in the South China Sea is provocative, but “in the scale of what we are talking about, that is nothing” compared with conflicts in North-East Asia, where China and Japan are contesting claims over the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands (claimed as the Diaoyus by China). Of the Senkakus conflict, Prof Ball says: “We are talking about **actual footsteps towards nuclear war** – submarines and missiles.” Chinese and Japanese activity in the Senkakus region has escalated to the point where sometimes there are “at least 40 aircraft jostling” over the contested area, he said. Alarm bells were set off near the Senkakus in January last year when a Chinese military vessel trained its fire-control radar on a Japanese naval destroyer. The incident spurred the Japanese Defense Ministry to go public about that event and reveal another incident from a few days prior, when a Chinese frigate directed fire-control radar at a Japanese military helicopter. Fire-control radars are not like surveillance or early warning radars – they have one purpose and that is to lock onto a target in order to fire a missile. “Someone does that to us, we fire back,” Prof Ball said. Counter Measures Needed Prof Ball is recognised for encouraging openness and transparency, and for his advocacy of multilateral institutions. He has been called one of the region’s “most energetic and activist leaders in establishing forums for security dialogue and measures for building confidence”. In his experience visiting China over the years, however, Prof Ball says gaining open dialogue and transparency with Chinese military leaders is difficult. He recounted a private meeting with a Chinese admiral shortly after the fire-control radar incident. Prof Ball had seen direct evidence of the encounter – “tapes of the radar frequencies, the pulse rates and the pulse repetition frequencies” – and wanted to know what had happened on the Chinese side and why it took place. “In a private meeting, I asked the admiral why … and he denied it to my face,” Prof Ball said. The Chinese admiral would not even concede that an incident had happened. “I don’t see the point of this sort of dialogue,” he added. With **so many players** in the region and **few barriers against conflict escalation**, the North-East Asian nuclear arms race is **now far more complex and dangerous** than the Cold War, he says. In the Cold War, there were mechanisms at each level of potential confrontation, including a direct hotline between the US and Soviet leaders. “Once things get serious here, [there is] **nothing to slow things down.** On the contrary, **you have all the incentives to go first,”** he said.

### ! – Sino-Japan War

#### Sino-Japan conflict draws in the US and triggers nuclear escalation.

Ayson & Bell 14 (Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, and Adjunct Professor at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre & Desmond Ball Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University, where he was head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre from 1984 to 1991., “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?”, Survival | vol. 56 no. 6 | December 2014–January 2015 | pp. 135–166)

Nuclear options and incentives

The role of nuclear weapons is one of the most important aspects of the escalation question in North Asia, as China has a nuclear arsenal and Japan relies on US extended deterrence. If Beijing and Tokyo engage in conventional military conflict, the prospects of direct Sino-American nuclear escalation come into play more clearly. One of the main concerns about the possibility of such escalation revolves around America’s superiority to China in terms of conventional fighting power.41 While China is closing that gap, some American conventional systems allow Washington to threaten China with accurate, destructive strikes that Beijing cannot hope to replicate. Should Sino-American hostilities seem likely to intensify, China could be tempted to utilise its nuclear forces. In such a conflict, however, Beijing should be aware that any attempted nuclear attack on the US would be almost guaranteed to generate a swift and probably disproportionate nuclear response. Mutual fear of surprise attacks and inadvertent nuclear war could not be ruled out, but nuclear deterrence might well operate effectively.42

In the early stages of a conflict involving only China and Japan, the nuclear question takes on a different perspective. Beijing would still face the prospect of relative conventional-military weakness, especially when it considered the possibility of American support to Tokyo. But if China decided to escalate by threatening Japan with nuclear bombardment, it would have to weigh the credibility of American extended deterrence, some portion of which would almost certainly swing into action. At the very least, China would have to deal with the costs of a strong conventional response by the US.

One might expect that nuclear threats, implicit or otherwise, would remain in the background. Washington could regard the threat of a nuclear response as effective leverage, discouraging China from escalating a conventional conflict with Japan without the need for heavy US involvement in a conventional military contest. Similarly, China might remind Japan about the existence of its nuclear forces, so as to highlight the potential costs of conventional escalation. Testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during early hostilities – rather like the 2014 Russian test, apparently longscheduled, during the Ukraine crisis – could be such a signalling mechanism.

If China suffers, or merely fears, a significant attack on its command and control systems, there are other material reasons why nuclear escalation could become more likely. Unlike the US or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China lacks separate, redundant theatre and strategic networks for C4ISR. This increases the likelihood that what Japan and especially the US view as an escalating conflict in the conventional domain could have quite a different appearance to Chinese decision-makers. Conventional escalation could easily cause the US to take measures that imperilled China’s control of its nuclear systems. Aware of its general C4ISR vulnerability, Beijing would already have experienced considerable pressure to use its antisatellite systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles (including the DF21-D) and other anti-carrier weapons, and to accelerate its cyber attacks.43 The US would likely respond to the use of these capabilities by destroying all remaining Chinese force elements in any way connected to them, which would have further C4ISR implications for China. America could be expected to forgo attacks on Chinese urban–industrial centres and many other force elements. Washington would seek to convey restraint and selectivity in its response, but would already have provided Beijing with a perverse incentive to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively, out of fear that its capacity to maintain command and control of these systems was being destroyed in the conventional conflict.

### ! – Nuke Winter

#### Nuke winter destroys the climate – regional war is sufficient

Cirincione 8 -- President of the [Ploughshares Fund](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ploughshares_Fund), a public grant-making foundation focused on nuclear weapons policy and conflict resolution. Cirincione had previously served as vice president for national security and international policy at the [Center for American Progress](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_American_Progress) in [Washington, DC](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington,_DC), and for eight years as the director for non-proliferation at the [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnegie_Endowment_for_International_Peace). (Joseph, “The continuing threat of nuclear war.” In Global Catastrophic Risk, ed. Bostrom and Cirkovic, Oxford, 2008)

Carl **Sagan** and Richard Turco, two of the original scientists developing the nuclear winter analysis, **concluded** in 1993: Especially through the destruction of global agriculture, nuclear winter might be considerably worse than the short-term blast, radiation, fire, and fallout of nuclear war. It would carry nuclear war to many nations that no one intended to attack, including the poorest and most vulnerable.22 **In 2007, members** of the original group of nuclear winter scientists **collectively performed a new comprehensive quantitative** **assessment utilizing** the **latest computer** and climate **models**. They concluded that **even a small-scale, regional nuclear war could** kill as many people as died in all of World War II and **seriously disrupt the global climate for a decade or more,** harming nearly everyone on Earth. The scientists considered **a nuclear exchange involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs** (15 kilotons) on cities in the subtropics, and found that: Smoke emissions of 100 low-yield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict would generate substantial global-scale climate anomalies, although not as large as the previous 'nuclear winter' scenarios for a full-scale war. However, indirect effect on surface land temperatures, precipitation rates, and growing season lengths would be likely to degrade agricultural productivity to an extent that historically has led to famines in Africa, India and Japan after the 1784 Laki eruption or in the northeastern United States and Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815. Climatic anomalies could persist for a decade or more because of smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous nuclear winter calculations or after volcanic eruptions.23 The scientists concluded that the nuclear explosions and firestorms in modern cities would inject black carbon particles higher into the atmosphere than previously thought and higher than normal volcanic activity (see Chapter 10, this volume). Blocking the Sun's thermal energy, the smoke clouds would lower temperatures regionally and globally for several years, open up new holes in the ozone layer protecting the Earth from harmful radiation, reduce global precipitation by about 10% and trigger massive crop failures. Overall, the global cooling from a regional nuclear war would be about twice as large as the global warming of the past century 'and would lead to temperatures cooler than the pre-industrial Little Ice Age'.

### Yes Prolif – TL [Generic]

#### No barriers – each can proliferate in less than 2 years – that's Fitzpatrick

#### All nuclear technology is dual-use – reactors can enrich uranium beyond the point needed for bombs, it just requires more time

#### Missile capability – Asian countries can develop delivery systems to launch fissile material

#### Nuclear expertise – a history of nuclear development and industrial knowledge means each country has engineers needed to craft a bomb

#### No barriers – each can proliferate in less than 2 years

Fitzpatrick 16 [Mark Fitzpatrick (Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme), *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2/2/2016] AZ

Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and Taiwan are likely to remain latent nuclear powers for the foreseeable future. Their civilian nuclear programmes and development of several dual-use technologies would enable them to produce nuclear weapons in perhaps two years – or less in Japan’s case – in the unlikely event that they were to abandon their firm adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Sophisticated missile programmes in South Korea and rocket launch technologies in Japan could be adopted for warhead delivery vehicles.

#### Yes motive – north korea and china drive prolif

Fitzpatrick 16 [Mark Fitzpatrick (Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme), *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2/2/2016] AZ

This report is a summary from the Sejong Institute’s 6 th Colloquium held on February 11, 2016, on the topic of “Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan” presented by Mark Fitzpatrick who currently heads the Washington office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Fitzpatrick contends that despite the fact that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all U.S. allies and democracies, they all have motives for becoming nuclear powers. In effect, all three countries have economic, technological, and industrial basis upon which they could easily build nuclear weapons in short periods—hence, the term “latent nuclear powers.” Fitzpatrick assesses that Japan’s nuclear latency is most pronounced and Taiwan’s motivation and ambition for nuclear weapons are also strong depending on its need to respond to China’s threats. With regard to South Korea’s position, Fitzpatrick argues that unlike the commonly held view among the public in Korea, the international society views South Korea’s nuclear policy with a certain degree of skepticism due to its previous record of attempting to develop nuclear weapons in the past. Moreover, Fitzpatrick states that South Korea becoming a nuclear power is certainly not propitious considering the negative political, security, and economic effects and implications against the backdrop of recent nuclear weapons and long-range missiles tests by North Korea.

### Yes Prolif – TL [SoKo]

#### SoKo can proliferate- NoKo tests push them to the brink

Jenkins 14 (Graham W. Jenkins, research assistant at the Institute for Defense Analyses, January 2014, “Failure to Ignite: The Absence of Cascading Nuclear Proliferation”, from CSIS’s “Nuclear Scholars Initiative” edited by Sarah Weiner, pg. 84-86)SDL

Put simply, South Korea now possesses the full set of skills and experience necessary to develop fissile materials suitable for a nuclear weapon, as well as significant portions of the fuel cycle. South Korean capabilities imply an existing capacity to produce very significant quantities of further refined fissile products, as well as the ability to rapidly increase that capacity. Obtaining raw materials like uranium ore would pose a challenge, as they are currently supplied from the United States under a “123 agreement.”17 However, South Korea is seeking to change its status and close the fuel cycle in the 2014 renewal of the 123 agreement currently being negotiated between Washington and Seoul.18 Additionally, South Korea has a fledgling space program under way and possesses advanced missile technology. In 2012 Washington and Seoul reached an agreement that nullifies a 1979 memorandum of understanding between the two, alloing South Korea—as a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—to construct and deploy ballistic missiles with a range of up to 800km (500 miles), up from the previous limitation of 300km (186 miles).19 Thus, delivering nuclear weapons (following miniaturization) would not be a barrier to potential South Korean nuclear capabilities. In sum, South Korea possesses the requisite capabilities to develop and deliver nuclear weapons. What about the intent? What intent, if any, does South Korea have to develop nuclear weapons, and why have they not done so in the wake of North Korean nuclear testing? Public sentiment has been significantly in favor of either developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability or reintroducing nonstrategic U.S. nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. This popular opinion grew especially strong following the third North Korean nuclear test in which 66 percent of the South Korean public supported the development of nuclear weapons in the country.20 And this number is not an especially high outlier. Support since 2010 has averaged around 63 percent.21 South Korean support for developing nuclear weapons has become, in essence, a mainstream position. Perhaps this explains Seoul’s desire to finally close the fuel cycle, and perhaps that open fuel cycle explains the lack of South Korean proliferation to date—it may actually be a case of lack of capability and not one of intent. The IAEA’s investigations into Korean enrichment have no doubt played a role as well in retarding, if not halting altogether, any current progress toward permanent enrichment capabilities. With this recent round of revelations, the accession of South Korea to the Additional Protocol can be seen as a diplomatic coup and one without which South Korea may have very well possessed sufficient stocks of fissile material to produce a nuclear arsenal. Perhaps the most compelling, if unheralded explanation for why South Korea has not developed a nuclear weapons capability is the extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Indeed, not a few analysts believe that U.S. extended deterrence, which encompasses both South Korea and Japan, is the primary reason that the ROK has never fully committed to pursuing nuclear weapons.22 But decades of verbal assurances were not enough to assuage Seoul. It was only in 2009 that the deterrence guarantee was written and made explicit by President Barack Obama, at the urging of the South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak at a nuclear summit in Washington, DC.23 Interestingly, only 48 percent of the South Korean public believes that the United States would actually consider using a nuclear weapon in South Korea’s defense (and that proportion has decreased since the beginning of the written nuclear guarantee).24 The continued strength and reaffirmation of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea and the lack of a South Korean nuclear program are certainly positive signs, but even these may not last forever. A clear disconnect exists between elite South Korean opinion and that of the general public—a fortunate thing for the time being. With each North Korean test chipping away at South Korean resolve, it may only be a matter of time before it erodes altogether. What this means for South Korean nuclear aspirations is that Seoul’s commitment to the NPT and the global nonproliferation regime is perhaps weaker than previously thought. Hopefully U.S. assurances and guarantees—as well as the threat of international opprobrium and economic disaster—will be enough to continue to maintain the status quo. However, if Pyongyang continues to test nuclear weapons with impunity and further develop its nuclear capabilities, Seoul may decide that it has no choice but to forge its own nuclear path.25 But one thing is clear: bilateral and multilateral and international pressure must be applied to potential proliferators well in advance.

### Yes Prolif – TL [Taiwan]

#### Taiwan can proliferate – tech and expertise

Hersman & Peters 6 [Rebecca K. C. Hersman (Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies), and Robert Peter, "NUCLEAR U-TURNS Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2006] AZ

Today, Taiwan is a functioning multiparty democracy with a vibrant economy. The first free election took place in 1996, and Taiwan is ruled by a center-left coalition with views far different from the authoritarian policies of the Chiang family. Estimates of Taiwan’s nuclear capabilities are mixed. The island has six nuclear reactors producing almost 5,000 MWe, with two additional reactors of similar output under construction.38 While most of the scientists involved with the original weapons programs are either retired or dead and the initial reactors that supported separation and enrichment experiments remain shuttered, Taiwan has a highly educated, engineering-oriented workforce and retains strong industrial and nuclear infrastructures. Taiwan could acquire or indigenously build other key components\*such as centrifuges for fissile material processing\* relatively easily. Should the country choose to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it could probably do so successfully and potentially clandestinely. As one scholar puts it, ‘‘Much of the basic technology already exists on the island; it needs only a political directive to be put into motion.’’39

### Yes Prolif – A2 Treaties Check [Taiwan]

#### No checks on Taiwanese prolif – it's outside the legal system due to its unique status

Kassenova 12 [Togzhan Kassenova (Associate in Nuclear Policy Program at CEIP), "Global Non-Proliferation and the Taiwan Dilemma," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/22/2012] AZ

Taiwan is too important an actor to leave outside of international efforts to prevent WMD proliferation. The Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) all require their parties to prevent proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, respectively.5 Paradoxically, however, because Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, it cannot be a party to any of these WMD non-proliferation treaties. Taiwan is also technically outside the reach of the 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all UN member states to implement effective domestic WMD proliferation controls.6 Similarly, Taipei cannot be considered for membership in multilateral export control regimes (MECRs), voluntary coalitions of countries and major producers of dual-use materials and technology. Parties to the four MECRs — the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement — adhere to a common set of rules that guide the export of sensitive goods with the objective of preventing proliferation. MECRs provide an important forum to exchange information on emerging proliferation-sensitive materials and technologies, suspicious actors, export license denials, and other data that help participating governments to implement proliferation export controls. As far as multilateral frameworks are concerned, Taiwan has only a limited set of tools at its disposal to prevent WMD proliferation. The island’s political status restrains its access to international bodies that could help Taipei pursue proliferators. For example, Taiwan cannot call upon organizations such as Interpol to chase down proliferators and their agents. Taipei does not have access to Interpol’s I-24/7 global police communication system, which provides real-time information on criminals and criminal activities.7 Taipei is also limited in fighting international crime because it can only sign extradition agreements with a handful of small island nations with which it has diplomatic relations. As a result, Taiwan is not able to extradite criminals from other nations, nor can other nations easily repatriate criminals who may treat Taiwan as a “safe haven.” As a non-party to non-proliferation treaties and a non-member of multilateral export control regimes, Taiwan does not have the same legal obligations on the non-proliferation front as countries that belong to them. As a result, the international community is limited in its ability to hold Taiwan accountable to international non-proliferation standards. Taiwan also suffers from a lack of access to information and mechanisms that can help strengthen its ability to deal with proliferation challenges. Unfortunately, this creates a lose-lose situation, which, given Taiwan’s political status, is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

### Yes Prolif – TL [Japan]

#### Anti-prolif args are culturally outdated and ignore internal politics – Japan is shifting towards militarization, has the capacity, and is bypassing legal restraints

Hunt 15 [Jonathan Hunt (Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Stanton Nuclear Security Program, fellow @ Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Visiting Professor @ Emory University), “Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow”, Foreign Policy, 8/5/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/]

With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for Japan’s commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread, especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the global nuclear watchdog — on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEA’s voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs’ enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki — in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities’ populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel — the Lucky Dragon — one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies — Godzilla. One year later, Japan’s parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet Japanese leaders’ renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japan’s prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their country’s national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw “no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”) After China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson “that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them.” He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were “nonsense.” Why then did Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after China’s nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, “if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.” These reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons,” he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japan’s nuclear posture. When Sato’s former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japan’s acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Ford’s reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida — who hails from Hiroshima — renewed calls to “accelerate nuclear disarmament” at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to “witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings.” And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function “more proactively” in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal “would not necessarily violate” the pacifist constitution.

#### Their ev assumes a strong US security guarantee in East Asia – Crowley says Asian allies perceive the US as withdrawing from the region, which sparks prolif as protection against potential threats like China

#### The public accepts nuclear weapons – rising nationalism and decreased opposition from younger generations

Tatsumi and Weiner 14 Yuki Tatsumi, senior associate of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center, Dr. Robert Weiner Naval Postgraduate School, “Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy”, Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report Number 2014-004, February 2014, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2014/2014%20004%20Japan%20Politicization.pdf

Alongside Japan’s individual political parties and its party system as a whole, changes in grassroots public opinion can also be seen as a potential source of political pressure away from Japan’s nuclear-policy status quo. Two streams of public opinion in this vein have been alluded to above: a gradual warming to the formerly taboo notion of Japanese autonomous nuclear weapons capabilities, and an apparent rise in nationalism. The former has gradually been growing with the passing of the generations that directly witnessed Japan’s atomic bombings and the more general privations of war, and that in turn formed the backbone of Japan’s peace and nonproliferation movements. Younger generations treat security policy, including nuclear weapons, more pragmatically, and their security consciousness is more strongly shaped by the immediate nuclear threat posed by North Korea and the larger but latent threat posed by China. The rise in nationalism shares some of the same roots, but in recent years has been more acutely spurred by tensions with China and South Korea over interpretations of World War II-era history, which itself is partly a product of political reform and increasing economic competitiveness on the part of those two neighbors; and by conflict over disputed island territories.

### Yes Prolif – A2 Pacifism [Japan]

#### 1. Even if the population is pacifist, the government has historically and currently embraced prolif as a way to strengthen Japan's standing 2. Hunt assumes their warrant – Japan may have been pacifist once, but the world war 2 generation is now a tiny portion of the population and pacifism is outdated

### Yes Prolif – A2 Legal Barriers [Japan]

#### Legal restraints no longer apply – creative lawyering by Abe has justified foreign military action and nuclearization is just one step away – that's Crowley

### Yes Prolif – A2 Expensive [Japan]

#### Citizens perceive the need for national security as more important than funds – open sea lanes for trade and fierce competition with China means economics also drives prolif

**A2 No Motive**

#### Their ev assumes a strong US security guarantee – if allies perceive declining US credibility in East Asia, they're driven to build their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Chinese aggression and North Korean nukes – expanding Chinese influence in the East China Sea and accelerating NoKo tests lead Asian allies to proliferate

#### *[If we win even one of the three countries will proliferate absent the plan, then it pushes the others to build nukes for deterrence]*

### A2 Empx = No Prolif

#### Past events prove nothing – perceived changes in US security policy trigger rapid Asian prolif

Hersman & Peters 6 [Rebecca K. C. Hersman (Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies), and Robert Peter, "NUCLEAR U-TURNS Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2006] AZ

Finally, what might induce South Korea and Taiwan to again pursue nuclear weapons? While today, the commitment of South Korea and Taiwan to nonproliferation seems strong, recent events in North Korea could cause them to reexamine their nuclear status. Further, the record of rollback in these states emphasizes the fact that nuclear rollback is a process, not an outcome or state of being\*success in the past by no means assures success in the future. Rollback in South Korea and Taiwan is not ‘‘over’’\*intent could change rapidly with little warning, sending these countries back into the ‘‘danger zone.’’ Moreover, for Seoul and Taipei, Washington is at the center of this rollback process. Perceived shifts in U.S. policy triggered increased interest in nuclear weapons in both Taiwan and South Korea. American intelligence and international monitoring were essential to exposing covert nuclear weapons activities, and U.S. pressure and security assurances were the overwhelming factors influencing rollback of these nuclear programs. Sustained U.S. attention, including close intelligence monitoring, will be essential to preserving success, especially in the face of ongoing technology creep. Failure to maintain attention might invite an era in which the long-feared scenario of ‘‘nuclear dominoes’’\* when one state’s decision to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in its national security calculus sets off a cascade of such decisions in other states\*ultimately comes to pass.

**A2 Assurance Resilient [Generic]**

**US credibility in the region is declining – that's Crowley**

1. **Allies perceive US flip-flops on Chinese aggression as weakness and lack of security guarantee**
2. **Trump's isolationist campaign strategy scares allies dependent on our military protection – a close and drawn-out election forces allies to preempt US withdrawal with nuclear weapons of their own**
3. **Failure by Obama to rhetorically condemn North Korean nuclear tests is perceived as flagging commitment in Asia**

**Assurance is failing now – funding, distractions, China**

**Green et al. ’16** (STUDY DIRECTORS: **Michael Green**, PhD @ SAIS, is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, chair in Japanese foreign policy at Georgetown, served on the staff of the NSC as the director of Asian Affairs, senior fellow for East Asian security on the Council of Foreign Relations; **Kathleen Hicks**, PhD in Political Science @ MIT, is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, served as a senior civilian official in the DoD; **Mark Cancian**, senior advisor to the International Security Program, adjunct professor of strategic studies @ John Hopkins. TEAM LEADS: Zach Cooper; John Schaus. A ton of different contributing authors. “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships” January 2016, *CSIS*, http://csis.org/files/publication/160119\_Green\_AsiaPacificRebalance2025\_Web\_0.pdf)

Nevertheless, the United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional relationships, posture, operational concepts, and capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the rebalance. **The past 14 years of war have left the military services with significant challenges in recapitalizing equipment used at a pace faster than programmed, reestablishing full-spectrum force readiness, and confronting an expanding range of challenges from state and nonstate actors globally**. It is doing so while drawing down forces and structure and, the recent two-year budget deal notwithstanding, with lower long-term defense spending projections than planned even a few years ago. **China’s rapidly expanding military investments and increasingly coercive actions in the region demonstrate both the long-term and near-term challenges facing the** **U**nited **S**tates **and its allies and partners in protecting vital regional and global interests**. Although Washington seeks to cooperate with Beijing where it can, the United States must also ensure that its engagements, posture, concepts, and capabilities allow it to shape, deter, and, if necessarily, decisively defeat threats to U.S. interests. The threat of invasion by North Korea continues to decrease, but the North’s missile and nuclear programs continue unabated while scenarios for instability within North Korea appear less remote going forward. Over the last few years, **the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed significant developments that require a reappraisal of U.S. strategy and force posture**, as well as an assessment of the strategy and force posture of U.S. allies and partners. Many of these trends have improved prospects for regional security, but some **new challenges are emerging**, **and some existing risks are worsening**. These trends span issue areas of geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics, and military considerations. Geopolitically, most states in the Asia-Pacific region are embracing closer security and economic ties with the United States. At the same time, however, states across the region have become more sensitive to China’s growing political, economic, and military power, and are potentially vulnerable to Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior. Polls in Asian countries indicate strong support for the rebalance, with the notable exception of China.5 The United States is working bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally to reinforce critical rules and norms that underpin a secure and prosperous regional and international order. Yet despite these efforts, there is more acrimony and tension in the U.S.-China relationship, a general deterioration in relations with Russia, and increasing bellicosity from North Korea. In preparing this study, **the authors heard a consistent refrain from U.S. allies** **and partners** **that, despite their appreciation for the goals of the rebalance, many regional observers worry that U.S. efforts to manage the Iran nuclear negotiations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and conflict with** the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (**ISIL) have distracted it from fully implementing the rebalance**. The administration has taken important steps to reinforce the rebalance strategy, beginning with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and recently, the August 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy prepared for Congress.6 The authors also found that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is well aligned with the rest of DOD in its various lines of effort, including theater campaign planning. Much progress has been made since 2012, when CSIS scholars found significant disconnects across the U.S. government and with allies and partners. Nevertheless, **the implementation of the rebalance may be insufficient to secure U.S. interests.** **Actions by countries in the region routinely challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments, and U.S. capability development is not keeping pace with challenges by potential competitors, resulting in the balance of military power in the region shifting against the** **U**nited **S**tates. First, **the Obama administration still has not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the region, particularly when it comes to managing China’s rise.** **The language** used to explain the rebalance in administration speeches and documents has varied substantially over the last four years.7 The 2012 CSIS independent assessment highlighted this shortcoming, but it **remains a problem in terms of reassuring allies and partners and sustaining congressional support.** Second, **cuts to the defense budget from 2009–2015** **have limited the** **Defense Department’s ability to pursue the rebalance**. The October 2015 budget agreement notwithstanding, **long-term budget uncertainty** and **the large cuts already implemented represent major changes from the environment** that existed when CSIS scholars conducted the 2012 review. Third, while the U.S. military has instituted major posture changes and is developing new military capabilities to strengthen the rebalance, **the** anti-access/area denial (**A2/AD**) **challenge is increasing and concerns are growing about the ability of potential adversaries to hold at risk forward-deployed and forward-operating forces throughout the region**. Chinese military strategy places a premium on investments in A2/AD capabilities. Its A2/AD umbrella includes long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems, and submarines. The goal of these systems is to restrict or outright deny an attacker freedom of entry or maneuver. Chinese investments in cyber; electronic warfare (EW); a blue-water navy; missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities serve as powerful reminders of China’s plans to push the United States out of the region in a conflict. **These capabilities give China the ability to hold at risk U.S. installations and naval assets in the Western Pacific**, U.S. allies and partners, and the freedom to use international air and waterways on which the U.S. economy depends. **Absent major operational or technology breakthroughs by the** **U**nited **S**tates and its allies and partners, **substantial risk remains that China’s strategy could undermine the U.S. military’s ability to defend U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific**. Fourth, **China’s tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectations**—**as demonstrated by Beijing’s increased operational tempo and construction of military airfields and facilities on seven features in the Spratly Islands**. This risk tolerance requires the United States to reassess its China policy, and may lead allies and partners to do the same.

### A2 Assurance Resilient [Japan]

**No assurance credibility now**

**Chen 14** [Dingding Chen (assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute), The Diplomat, 4-29-2014, "4 Reasons Why Japan (Still) Doubts US Security Assurances," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/4-reasons-why-japan-still-doubts-us-security-assurances/]

U.S. President Barack Obama just finished a state visit to Japan last week. In a delayed joint statement released on Friday, the United States, for the first time, clearly said that America’s “commitments under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security … extend to all the territories under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. In that context, the United States opposes any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands.” This, perhaps, is the only achievement for Japan as a trade agreement was not reached by the two sides. Since the U.S. has given Japan a clear assurance in writing to help Japan defend the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, shouldn’t Japan feel reassured? **But from a Japanese perspective, Obama’s state visit just makes the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security less credible.** Some scholars contend that such worries are unfounded and irrational. That view is flawed. Actually **there are four good reasons why Japan still feels insecure.** First, **there is an inherent problem in any alliance relationship that makes credibility always imperfect. It is the moral hazard problem.** Basically, it means that **a client state will tend to act recklessly because it believes that the patron state will offer unconditional support, thus dragging the patron state into an unnecessary conflict or war. Because of this entrapment problem, the patron state will always be very careful not to give a “blank check” to the client state** when it comes to security assurances. **The result is that the client state**, in turn, **will always be suspicious of the patron state’s commitment to its security. To maintain this alliance relationship, the patron state will need to constantly reaffirm its commitment to the client state through actions or words**. This is partly why **the U.S. has always emphasized that it is neutral on the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, thus disappointing Japan.** Second**, there is the problem of divergent interests between Japan and the United States. While Japan might highly value the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands** for historical, economic, and strategic reasons, **most Americans simply view the islands as a bunch of rocks with very little value to the U.S.** interest in the region. **There is no U.S. military base or U.S. military presence on the islands, and thus a possible attack by China on the islands will not result in American casualties.** Moreover, **the U.S. highly values a stable and peaceful relationship with China as the two share a number of common interests. Under such conditions, it is hard for the U.S. to decide to aid Japan militarily** even though the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security theoretically covers the islands, as President Obama just confirmed during his visit in Tokyo. Moreover, both Japan and the US understand this point perfectly. **When two parties of an alliance relationship have seriously divergent national interests, it is unsurprising that the client state would doubt the patron state’s commitment to its security. Third, there is the problem of power shifts in Asia.** Although no one doubts that the U.S. is still the only superpower in the world and will remain so for another 20 or so years, **many countries in Asia are still concerned about the future distribution of power between China and the United States.** China’s military spending is increasing quickly whereas U.S. military spending is contracting. The controversial “pivot to Asia” will be seriously hindered if the U.S. is unable to finance it, evidenced by recent remarks by U.S. defense officials. **Finally, the past inaction toward regional crises in Syria, Crimea, and the East China Sea have seriously undermined U.S. credibility in the world, thus making Japanese officials more nervous about the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security.** While many U.S. scholars (here and here) are quick to point out the main differences between Syria and Crimea and Japan as Japan is an ally of the U.S., what they have forgotten is that Japanese perceptions of U.S. credibility ultimately matter. In this case, **Japanese are rightly worried that Obama is a weak president and cannot act tough when a crisis comes**. Furthermore, **it is not just one event that undermines the U.S. credibility; it is a series of events from Syria to the East China Sea** (the U.S. only verbally protested when China declared its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in 2013) to Crimea that together seriously undermine the U.S. credibility. In short, **we cannot really blame the Japanese for being irrational or paranoid when they question the US credibility**. Three of the four **reasons for Japanese doubts are structural reasons and they do not change quickly.** That means U.S. credibility will continue to be questioned by U.S. allies around the world. Perhaps the United States can demonstrate its credibility by acting tough the next time a regional crisis emerges. Until then, it is not surprising that Obama’s weak assurance this past week to Tokyo only exacerbated Japan’s doubts and fears.

### A2 Nuclear Umbrella Solves

#### Japan doesn’t trust the nuclear umbrella

Samuels 9, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Wing Walking: The US–Japan Alliance, www.globalasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/360.pdf

Getting the alliance right is more urgent than it may seem. With China rising and new nuclear As in the case of the Depression Era “wing-walkers” who entertained crowds high above state fairs with their airborne acrobatics, in matters of national security it is dangerous to let go with one hand before having a secure grasp with the other. 10 “An Alliance in Need of Attention,” International Herald Tribune, 23 January 2008. 11 See her 13 February speech to the Asia Society, op.cit. 20 global asia Cover story US–Japan Relations facts on North Korean ground, some in Tokyo worry that the US nuclear umbrella might be developing holes.12 Japan is increasingly concerned about being bullied by a stronger China or blackmailed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, while the US is focused on nuclear proliferation and terrorist attacks on American territory. Much to Tokyo’s chagrin, Washington ceded leadership in multilateral talks about North Korea to Beijing, and in 2008 Washington took North Korea off the list of state-sponsors of terrorism, tacitly accepting North Korean nukes.

### A2 NPT Solves

#### The NPT is at its weakest in decades

Wilson 15 (Ward Wilson, Senior Fellow and director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project at the British American Security Information Council, 5/7/2015, “How nuclear realists falsely frame the nuclear weapons debate”, http://thebulletin.org/how-nuclear-realists-falsely-frame-nuclear-weapons-debate8306)

There has never been as much dissatisfaction with the international framework governing nuclear weapons (the Non-Proliferation Treaty) as there is today. The treaty is being reviewed and debated at the United Nations in New York this month, and for the first time in 35 years there are serious concerns that it might tear apart at the seams. Increasingly, there are those who feel strongly that the world would be safer without nuclear weapons, and that the nuclear-armed states (whose promise to work seriously toward disarmament in Article VI of the treaty is one of the tender spots creating anger and resentment) are not fulfilling their obligations. The potential unraveling of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is causing a careful reexamination of the assumptions that underlie the entire nuclear weapons debate. And like a captain who waits too long to put his boat into dry dock to look for rot under the waterline, the results have been shocking. Much of the intellectual structure supporting the rationale for nuclear weapons is made up of anachronistic ideas from the Cold War. Much of what we thought we knew has turned out to be wrong or inadequate. This has led to some sharp, interesting exchanges. Rather than being a stale debate that occasions stifled yawns, the debate about nuclear weapons is suddenly full of surprising new developments. Perhaps the most interesting new thinking involves the familiar framing of the debate as a contest between realists and idealists. It turns out this division was not really a distinction created for intellectual clarity but a sort of gerrymandering that aimed to fix the outcome of the debate. This gerrymandering has been so successful, with one side in the debate losing so consistently, that most people now hesitate to be associated with the losers. In the United States, where this framing is most prevalent and shapes the debate most strongly, enthusiastic support for disarmament (except in the most far-off, one-day, maybe-someday terms) is tantamount to professional suicide. Politicians, for example, rightly see that in the current environment taking an anti-nuclear position is a quick way to be branded as starry-eyed, inexperienced, and unrealistic. Carl Bildt famously said in the summer of 2013, when he was Foreign Minister of Sweden, that states questioning the importance of nuclear weapons are “not serious.” Opinion shapers and thought leaders draw back as well. Journalists, particularly, like to think of themselves as hard-boiled, worldly cynics. Because opposition to nuclear weapons has been cast as “idealism,” journalists who take disarmament arguments seriously risk their credibility with colleagues. Even anti-nuclear activists are likely to see themselves as Don Quixotes, tilting valiantly at targets they know they cannot dislodge, but bound by honor to keep on with the hopeless fight. Yet the emerging arguments paint this presumed dichotomy—between the hard-headed and the hopeful-hearted—as no more than clever salesmanship on the part of nuclear weapons believers. It works for them to claim that they are “realists” and to cast the debate as “realists v. idealists.” But the position carved out by most nuclear weapons “realists” is so unrealistic it would be laughable ... if the matter were not so serious.

#### NPT won't check prolif – Asian allies value security over treaty guarantees

Fitzpatrick 16 [Mark Fitzpatrick (Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme), *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2/2/2016] AZ

Although Japan today is a leading champion of the NPT, this was not always the case. It took Japan 18 months to sign the treaty after it was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and another six years to ratify the NPT. The reasons for hesitation were mixed. Many Japanese resented the treaty’s inequity between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ and feared the former would never disarm. There was a concern that giving up a nuclear option would forever assign Japan to a second-class global status, while nuclear-armed states, particularly China, maintained power to exert their will. For reasons of national security, policymakers wanted to keep a nuclear-weapons option for the future. Senior Foreign Ministry officials told US counterparts that Japan might need to consider nuclear weapons if India or other non-NPT signatories became nucleararmed or if China’s nuclear threat were to increase.25 There was also a strong commercial motivation not to be treated disadvantageously vis-à-vis Europe’s nuclear industry in terms of international inspections and access to advanced nuclear technologies. During negotiations on the treaty, the US assured both Japan and West Germany that Article IV would not interfere with dual-use civil nuclear programmes.26 Allowances for reprocessing in particular were reaffirmed before Japan ratified the treaty. Upon signing the NPT in February 1970, Japan attached a statement reflecting its interpretation that the only proscribed nuclear activities were acquisition or control over nuclear weapons or explosive devices and that the pursuit of peaceful nuclear activities by non-nuclear weapons states could not be subject to discriminatory treatment, even if such activities could have a dual use in weapons development. The statement stipulated that the NPT should be the first step toward complete nuclear disarmament. The statement also reaffirmed Japan’s right to withdraw from the treaty under Article X if the ‘supreme interests of the nation’ were endangered. Despite the reassurances Japan received in connection with signing the NPT, it still took six years to develop a consensus on ratification, which raised doubts internationally about Japan’s intentions. Indeed, some conservative forces within the governing LDP remained opposed because they wanted a nuclear option, while some leftist forces opposed ratification because the treaty allowed five states to remain nuclear-armed. Equal treatment with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was not assured until a safeguards agreement was negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1975 and signed the next year. Lingering worries about the credibility of the US alliance in the aftermath of president Nixon’s 1972 visit to China and the suspension of dollar–gold convertibility, neither with prior consultation, may have contributed to the delay.27 J When the NPT came up for indefinite extension in 1995, there remained some hesitation in Japan on the grounds that the US nuclear umbrella could not always be relied upon and that an indigenous option therefore should not be given up forever. Under pressure from the US and other states, Japan supported indefinite extension, but referred publicly to the NPT withdrawal clause, as noted below.

### A2 Deterrence [Short]

#### Deterrence doesn't check nuclear war in East Asia –

#### Geography – small countries like Japan can't maintain second-strike capability since a nuclear strike by a neighbor would wipe out the whole country – causes use 'em-or-lose 'em pressures – ensures miscalc and rapid escalation

#### Historical resentment and ongoing territorial disputes provide multiple potential hotspots for escalation – lack of redlines in the SCS, disputes about the Senkaku islands, and the Korean border

#### Poor command-and-control structures cause miscalc – new states have badly designed nuclear protocols and no attribution capabilities – causes leaders to enter nuclear conflict without full awareness

### A2 Deterrence [Long]

#### Deterrence doesn't check nuclear war in East Asia –

#### Geography – small countries like Japan can't maintain second-strike capability since a nuclear strike by a neighbor would wipe out the whole country – causes use 'em-or-lose 'em pressures – ensures miscalc and rapid escalation

#### Historical resentment and ongoing territorial disputes provide multiple potential hotspots for escalation – lack of redlines in the SCS, disputes about the Senkaku islands, and the Korean border

#### Poor command-and-control structures cause miscalc – new states have badly designed nuclear protocols and no attribution capabilities – causes leaders to enter nuclear conflict without full awareness

#### Several political factors make prolif intrinsically susceptible to nuclear escalation and conflict

Cimbala 15 – Stephen J., Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, “New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy” Ashgate Publishing Ltd

President Obama's defense "pivot" to Asia during this second term was announcement not intended to abandon Kurope or the Middle East, but to emphasize the growing importance of Asia economically and militarily. The increased significance of Asia for the United States and world economy is obvious to most. But the growing military significance of Asia is not so apparent, apart from the obvious economic superpower of China and its capacity for growing a world class military if it chooses to do so. The military significance of Asia also, but less obviously, includes the spread of nuclear weapons among states in that region. Nuclear Asia is becoming a dangerous place, but most of our concepts and strategies for understanding nuclear deterrence, arms control and nonproliferation are derived from European experience and Cold War history. But politics have changed, and the twenty-first century is marked by a relatively peaceful Europe and a boiling pot of contentious state actors in Asia, including some with regional ambitions that conflict with the preservation of a peaceful international status quo. Nuclear Asia now includes Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea as declared or de facto nuclear weapons states. If Iran acquires and deploys nuclear weapons, it will be a Middle Eastern state with nuclear missile reach into Asia. The United States also plays into nuclear Asia with its global interests and security guarantees to South Korea and Japan, both assumed to benefit from coverage by the US nuclear umbrella referred to as "extended deterrence." However, Japan feels threatened by a rising and more assertive China, and South Korea faces continued threats and posturing from North Korea. North Korea has declared that it will never give up its nuclear weapons, but the precise number of its nuclear weapons and their technical characteristics are shrouded in mystery and intelligence guesses. Failure to reverse North Korean nuclear proliferation or to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state would create an arc of nuclear instability across the greater Middle Kast and Asia, as well as jeopardizing the stability of the current nuclear nonproliferation regime. Additional states in Asia might want to acquire nuclear weapons, including Japan and South Korea. However, it is not necessarily the case that merely increasing the numbers of nuclear weapons states in a region necessarily raises the probability of war, or nuclear war, in that region. Countries are not missile farms. Nevertheless, the combination of regional hegemonic ambition, nationalism, and religious or cultural animosity, along with nuclear weapons, is a dangerous stew—Asian nuclear waters are full of sharks.

#### Geographical proximity exacerbates crises

Pinkston 10 – Daniel, North East Asia Deputy Project Director with the International Crisis Group in Seoul, “Nuclear Order in Northeast Asia: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Region, Nonproliferation, and the Tension between Disarmament and Deterrence” http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/pubs/pub\_pdfs/One%20Step%20Pinkston.pdf

Geography: U.S. and Soviet interests were global and their allies or client states confronted each other in several regions. However, the superpowers did not share significant borders, and they are geographically large countries. In Northeast Asia, geographic proximity can exacerbate crises, especially when nuclear weapons are involved. Confidence-building, transparency, and the establishment of crisis management mechanisms could be critical in avoiding violent conflict. While China and Russia have huge land masses, Japan, the Koreas, and Taiwan do not have the strategic depth to withstand even limited nuclear attacks. This could exacerbate a crisis on the Korean peninsula, for example, if ROK leaders felt they had to use extensive force in a quick preemptive strike to eliminate the possibility of DPRK nuclear retaliation

#### Cultural antagonisms incentivizes war

Cimbala 15 – Stephen J., Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, “New Nuclear Disorder : Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy” Ashgate Publishing Ltd

Here we see one of the reasons why nuclear proliferation in Asia might be- more dangerous than in Europe. It is sometimes supposed that cultural or other domestic political reasons make nuclear arms races more dangerous outside of Europe, compared to the situation that obtained between the US and Russia during the Cold War. Thus, for example, Indians and Pakistanis might be driven into war, including first and retaliatory uses of nuclear weapons, for reasons based on cultural antipathy, including ethno-national or religious hatred. The same fears have been expressed about a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East: not only between Israelis and Iranians, for example, but also between Iranian Shi'ites and leading Sunni Arab state powers, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These concerns about states being driven beyond the brink by motives other than European-derived or Eurocentric political ideologies are certainly valid. States in the Middle East or Asia are not going to war over the distinction between communism and capitalism.

## Heg

### ! – Russia War

#### Loss of security cred turns Russia war

Nau 15**-** professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs( Henry, “HOW RESTRAINT LEADS TO WAR”, Commentary, Proquest, 09/15,MSW)

Yet war has followed that strategy, too. The Islamic State has seized broad swaths of territory in northern Syria and Iraq not because Americans were there but because they were not-they moved in after U.S. troops pulled out. The jihadist Taliban group in Afghanistan and Pakistan massacred school children and stepped up suicide bombings, not because Americans were there but because they were not-American forces have ended their combat roles and have been preparing to leave Afghanistan altogether in 2016. **A nationalist-obsessed Russia annexed Crimea and destabilized eastern Ukraine after the United States struck a deal with Russia to give Obama some cover not to have to defend his own "red line" and go to war against Syria for using chemical weapons. China belligerently pressed claims and built military installations on disputed islands in the South and East China Seas not because the United States had badgered China over human rights but because then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had told Beijing that human-rights issues should not get in the way of a strategic partnership. These warlike responses were not provoked by aggressive behavior from the United States.** Which raises the question: Is it possible to be too modest and restrained in foreign affairs, just as it is possible to be too ambitious and aggressive? Answer: It is, indeed, as the history of the United States over the past century demonstrates. THE CLASSIC CASE OF EXCESSIVE AMBITION WAS PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON'S PROPOSAL FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS. The League committed the United States to provide for the security of every country in the world in the wake of the First World War. **The classic case of excessive restraint was U.S. foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s**. **The U.S. Congress rejected the League and provided for the security of no country, including the United States. The result: Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. After World War II, the United States put its faith in the United Nations and withdrew most of its military forces from Europe. The Soviet Union did not. Then in 1948 Moscow blockaded West Berlin, flaunting its capability to march uninterrupted to the English Channel if it intended to do so**. And even if it didn't, President Truman recognized that this military imbalance was no basis on which to negotiate with Moscow. He ended UN talks on Poland and other postwar issues, and another war, the Cold War, followed. Four decades later, the Cold War ended, and the United States put its faith again in the United Nations. President George H.W. Bush touted a "new world order" in 1990 and mobilized the entire world community to go to war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The UN provided the collective security once dreamt of by Woodrow Wilson. But only a year later, ethnic conflict erupted in Yugoslavia and Somalia. Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo followed. Russia blocked UN action. NATO stepped in.

### ! – Terror

#### Declining security cred turns terrorism

Nau 15**-** professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs( Henry, “HOW RESTRAINT LEADS TO WAR”, Commentary, Proquest, 09/15,MSW)

**Meanwhile, terrorism escalated, and jihadists twice struck the Twin Towers. America was back at war. According to the goals originally set-the toppling of evil and deadly regimes-America won these wars, including those in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, after each war, it lost the peace as it gyrated wildly between excessive ambition and excessive restraint. In 2005, George W. Bush declared "a policy...to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." That excessive ambition died painfully in the long occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.** As costs mounted, President Obama resolved not to end tyranny but to end wars. He embraced restraint, brought America home, and declared that if America minded its own business, then other countries would mind theirs. Why does America cycle between excessive ambition and excessive restraint, always followed by new attacks, which precipitate a much bigger war than might have been necessary earlier? The reasons are many, and some, at least, lie deep in America's foreignpolicy traditions. SINCE ITS ORIGINS, AMERICA HAS THOUGHT ABOUT ITS APPROACH TO THE WORLD IN THREE PRINCIPLED WAYS. **Thomas Jefferson introduced the internationalist way, the ambition that America could not only change domestic politics from monarchy to republicanism but also world politics from war to peaceable trade and diplomacy. Alexander Hamilton championed the realist way, advocating national power, alliances, and territorial filibusters to defend the new nation's western borders. And George Washington advocated the nationalist (in extreme form, isolationist) way, prioritizing independence and warning against both ambition and alliances in foreign affairs. These three approaches-internationalist, realist, and nationalist-became America's standard foreign-policy traditions.** The internationalist tradition, sometimes called liberal internationalism after the Democratic presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt who championed it, encourages the United States to believe it can tame international violence and spread democracy largely through multilateral diplomacy and economic interdependence, eventually replacing the balance of power with collective security that pools force and uses it as a last resort only with multilateral consent-the first Persian Gulf War being the prime example. President **Obama** came into office promising a rebirth of American diplomacy that would dispel the distrust spawned by American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. **He believed that if the United States practiced peaceful diplomacy, other nations would do so as well. But what if other nations do not reciprocate with friendly responses? What if they choose not to work together in international institutions but to compete for political, economic, and military advantage? What if they, like Russia and China, use UN negotiations to drag out or dilute nuclear negotiations with Iran and North Korea and support rather than oppose states, such as Syria, that sponsor terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere? What if they initiate military interventions of their own in Ukraine and the South and East China Seas to roll back Western influence? The other two traditions, realism and nationalism, expect other countries to behave this way.** Realists and nationalists consider it naive to believe that America can spread democracy through economic ties and international institutions. They empathize with other countries when these countries push back and defy Western encroachment. Why should Russia let Ukraine join NATO when Moscow has naval bases in Crimea? Why should China not patrol its own coastal sea lanes? The world is messy, and realists and nationalists have always said that America must accept the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be. Other countries value their independence and form of government as much as we value ours, and often their values and our values clash. Domestic differences cannot be altered; democracy is Western, not universal; and international affairs remain an arena of decentralized competition and anarchy that can be managed only by a statesmanlike combination of defense and diplomacy. Under the influence of liberal internationalism, America overextends to transform the world in hopes of reducing the use of military force and subjecting it to multilateral control. Under the influence of realism and nationalism, America retreats from the world to concentrate on stability and limited military defenses and abandons support for expanding freedom. **Each internationalist overreach encounters pushback by other countries and eventually higher military costs. Each realist or nationalist retreat is followed by renewed anarchy in the world and fresh attacks on the United States** or its allies, attacks more devastating than if the United States had stayed in the world and acted earlier. IT IS TIME FOR A FOURTH APPROACH .What can be done about this cycle? There is no quick fix. But over the longer run, there is another approach that might improve the American debate and from time to time anchor America's role in the world, moderating the tendency toward cycling. This approach would combine liberal internationalism's commitment to spread democracy and make the world a better place with the instruments of realism to back up diplomacy with military force. But it would limit this combination of freedom and force by making the spread of freedom a priority only on the borders of existing free countries, primarily in Europe and Asia, not in "every nation and culture" worldwide. And it would tie military actions to diplomatic compromises that favor freedom-not to military victory followed by occupation and interminable nation-building. In the end, such restrained ambition-what we might call conservative internationalism- aims for a world in which nation-states remain separate, sovereign, and armed, and do not entrust vital national-security interests to international institutions-and yet, as democracy spreads, live side by side in peaceful competition under the democratic peace. This approach was favored by Presidents Truman and Reagan, the presidents who initiated and won the Cold War. They did not shrink from the support of freedom abroad, and they armed their diplomacy to negotiate with authoritarian powers. But they also disciplined their approach. They prioritized the advance of freedom along the borders of existing free countries in Europe and Asia-not in every country in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. And they accumulated and used military leverage not to defeat their adversaries, but to achieve timely compromises that pushed authoritarian states incrementally toward freedom. Here is how this conservative internationalist approach might work to confront contemporary challenges. FIRST, THE UNITED STATES WOULD REMAIN THE CHAMPION OF FREEDOM IN THE WORLD . A world with more democratic states is without question a safer world for America. To grasp this fact, compare Europe and Japan in 2014 with Europe and Japan in 1914. If no effort had been made to democratize Germany and Japan, the world today would look much more like it did in 1914 or 1940; America would be surrounded by ideologically hostile states. Since 2006, the number of free countries has ebbed, and the world is again drifting toward despotism. In 2014 nearly twice as many countries regressed from the standards of freedom as countries that advanced. Turkey, Egypt, Russia, and China all took steps backward. As Freedom in the World 2015 reports, "acceptance of democracy as the world's dominant form of government-and of an international system built on democratic ideals-is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years."\* This fading of freedom matters. Authoritarian regimes are the primary source of violence in the world. **With dictators such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China**, these regimes eliminate opponents at home and seize territory abroad. As they increase their influence, they make the world a more unstable place. Neighboring states take note and recalibrate. **Hungary becomes friendlier with Moscow, TVirkey drifts away from Israel and NATO, South Korea becomes more dependent on China, and Iraq turns to partnership with Iran.** Freedom withers as it quietly accommodates oppression. To hunker down now, to go into a defensive crouch and give up the battle of advancing freedom abroad is simply the same as waiting for the world to deteriorate again and for the next war to come. So it has always been.

### ! – NPT

#### NPT cred solves nuclear war

Cooper 15 (Christian H. is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Pride of the Diplomats: Why the NPT Works” Global Policy Journal 5-19-15, <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/05/2015/pride-diplomats-why-npt-works>)

The review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) this month is a once every five years chance to reaffirm and strengthen one of the strongest international norms: that against the proliferation and use of nuclear technology for military means. Representatives of 190 countries are gathered to examine the treaty itself and discuss new ways to increase global buy-in against nuclear dangers. This time, they might do so in a critical new way. Israel will be at the table for the first time in 20 years as an observer only (having not signed the NPT), and according to a senior Obama administration official, has agreed to begin working with Arabs on an agenda for a conference to discuss a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. This is a dramatic change from 2010, when Israel refused to even consider the idea. Incremental diplomatic wins like this one lie at the core of the truly transnational strategic interest on the path to complete nuclear weapons disarmament. This is precisely why ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear technology must remain a key component of all nations’ foreign policy doctrines. Perhaps one reason the NPT, and its review every five years, is often overlooked by the general public is because at face value, everyone agrees more nukes are a bad thing. However, the NPT, and the corresponding diplomatic collaboration surrounding nuclear weapons, go much deeper than simply halting the proliferation of such dangerous technology. It is through this nearly universal treaty the next generation of world leaders will likely see nuclear disarmament, avoid an open war with Iran over its nuclear program, and stop a Middle East nuclear arms race in its tracks. However, it wasn't always clear the NPT would be the resounding success it is. In 1961 when Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told U.S. President John F. Kennedy that Israel's nuclear program at Dimona was for peaceful purposes only, Kennedy’s National Security Council was simultaneously warning that by the 1970s there could be 40 nuclear weapon armed states (including Israel). If an America in the future faced rampant nuclear threats and could not believe a face-to-face conversation with a reliable ally, what could anyone trust? There had to be a better way, and the NPT was the answer: Never trust, always verify. In Israel's defense, the only NPT signatories who have violated the treaty since adoption— Iran, Iraq and Syria—have sworn to destroy the Jewish state. Remaining a non-signatory to the NPT and maintaining an opaque nuclear first strike nuclear capability was strategically the right choice for Israel (regional de-stabilization be damned), and one that could be revisited given their 2015 decision to consider an agenda for a nuclear weapons free Middle East. Israel's gambit to wait for the NPT to become as ironclad as it has paid dividends that we can all reap both in June with a comprehensive agreement between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (including Germany, a group colloquially referred to as the P5+1) and Iran and well into the future. The defining trait of the NPT is reframing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from an act of national pride circa 1960 to an act contrary to international law by 1970. Thankfully, today we operate in a world that accepts nuclear power as a scientific pursuit but abhors its use for violence. This is also why Iran's right to domestically enrich as a signatory to the NPT will be a cornerstone of the P5+1 agreement that will be announced soon and likely ratified by the first of July. This comprehensive agreement will also implicitly underscore one of the pillars of the NPT: The gradual demilitarization of nuclear technology. And lest critics make the argument that the NPT can only be used to coerce pariah states like Iran, consider the actions of the major powers. Since the NPT entered into force, the United States has drastically reduced the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile by 80 percent and completely removed multiple entry warheads from its nuclear strike capacity. In some respects just as importantly, Washington is currently targeting the open ocean; there is no longer a single ICBM aimed at the Russian Federation and nuclear-armed, long-range strategic bombers have been removed from daily nuclear alert. Russia has made similar progress, with both commitments and demonstrated progress in reducing deployed warheads as well as deployed and undeployed delivery vehicles. Moscow has also taken the lead in other areas where the United States has lagged behind, singing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. To be sure, complications—including Russia’s tendency to view their remaining weapons as a counterweight to all NATO stockpiles rather than simply that of the United States—still exist, but the fact remains that the norm created by NPT has reduced the potential for nuclear disaster across the globe. And where has all that potential destruction gone? Fully 10% of electric power in the United States over the last two decades came from down-blended, highly enriched uranium earmarked for Russian megaton nuclear bombs. Over 20,000 warheads (and their associated risk of accidental launches) were removed from service all thanks the spirit of the NPT. The spirit of bilateral cooperation remains strong; despite the tensions in Ukraine, both the United States and the Russian Federation are fully implementing the terms of the New START treaty, wherein each shares data on the movement of strategic forces and both engage in reciprocal inspections of military facilities. The NPT is not just about non-proliferation; it is a shift in mindset that nuclear technology will be shared with those who want it for peaceful purposes in return for de-arming those who have militarized it. It has been a resounding victory for the idea of internationalism and the fundamental idea that a community of nations can come together and, through mutually-reinforcing and verifying behavior, make strategic choices that defy the self-serving nature of states in an anarchic system. Moreover, it has been the bedrock of a norm that spawned a range of bi- and multilateral measures to protect the world against the terrible risk of nuclear conflict. Collective continued nuclear demilitarization is a win for the diplomats of the world. Progress on the biggest issues comes in small breaks, such as the Israeli decision to if not pull a seat up to the table, at least pay close attention on the sidelines. Through extraordinary burdens of verification and disclosure, the NPT will continue to make the world a safer place.

### ! – US Primacy

**Maintaining the US led order is good**

\*War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove heg solves war because it makes democratic peace resilient globalization sustainable---it’s the deeper cause of proximate checks against war

**Owen 11 –** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew **Mack and his colleagues** at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they **present a study** with a striking conclusion, **driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias**, but they also do something quite unfashionable: **they bear good news.** **Social scientists** really **are** **not supposed to do that. Our job is**, if not to be Malthusians, then at least **to point out disturbing trends**, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that **violent conflict around the world has been decreasing** in fits and starts **since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better.** (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about *mutually* assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear **states are** not **deterred from fighting** nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in *international* war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the **proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war**); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and **interdependence has increased, hence less war**); and the notion that **people around the world are more anti-war** than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in *civil* wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? **How is** it **that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time**, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of **these mechanisms** **reinforce**s some of **the others**, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. **We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started**, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. **That factor is** what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony.** A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that **for the global economy to remain open**—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—**one powerful country must take the lead**. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails **paying for global public goods** (**keeping** the **sea lanes open**, providing liquidity to the international economy), **coercion** (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), **or both.** The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why **hegemonic stability theory could** not **apply to other areas of international cooperation**, including in **security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping** (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American **hegemony might** just **be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths** in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that **U.S. hegemony might** just **be a deeper cause of** the **proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. **American power and policies may be responsible for** these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the **market capitalism** that entails **economic openness and** produces **sustainable economic growth.** The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, **the U.S.-**led western **victory in the Cold War damaged** the **credibility of alternative paths to development**—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call **globalization is caused** in part **by the emergence of the U**nited **S**tates **as the global hegemon.** The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

### A2 China War

#### China rise doesn't conflict with US primacy

**Wohlforth** Dartmouth College Government Professor **9**

[William C., January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, And Great Power War”, <http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf>, World Politics 61, no. 1, p. 54-55, accessed 7/3/13, ALT]

**China’s quest for great power status after “the century of shame and ¶ humiliation” is a staple of foreign policy analysis**. Its preference for multipolarity and periodic resentment at what it sees as the United States’ ¶ assertion of special rights and privileges is also well established. Chinese analyses of multipolarity explicitly reﬂect the predicted preference ¶ for a ﬂat hierarchy over one in which a single state has primacy; that is, ¶ they express a preference for a world in which no power has a special ¶ claim to leadership.72 In the early 1990s Jiang Zemin attempted to act ¶ on this preference by translating China’s growing economic and military power into enhanced status in world affairs through competitive ¶ policies. As Avery Goldstein shows, this more forward policy soon provoked a nascent U.S. backlash against the perceived “China threat.”73¶ The signature event was Beijing’s decision to heighten tensions around ¶ the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96 in order to curb Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui’s independence policies and punish Washington for encouraging them. This resulted in the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carrier ¶ groups to the area and a dramatic upgrading of the U.S.-Japan security ¶ relationship, including potential collaboration on a theater missile defense system covering the East China Sea (and possibly Taiwan).

**According to** **many China watchers, the result was a clearer appreciation in Beijing of the costs and beneﬁts of a competitive search for ¶ status under unipolarity.** As Peter Gries puts it: “**While many Chinese ¶ have convinced themselves that U.S. power predominance cannot last, ¶ they do grudgingly acknowledge the world’s current unipolar nature.”74¶ As a result, Beijing adopted a “peaceful rise” strategy that downplays ¶ the prospect of direct competition for global parity with or primacy ¶ over the United States**.75 Thus, **notwithstanding an underlying preference for a ﬂatter global status hierarchy,** in terms of concrete policies ¶ **China remains a status quo power under unipolarity, seeking to enhance its standing via strategies that accommodate the existing global ¶ status quo**.76

#### Economic ties and deterrence outweigh.

Gelb 13 — Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and columnist for the *New York Times*, served as Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and was the recipient of the Distinguished Honor Award—the State Department’s highest honor, served as Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense where he was the recipient of the Distinguished Service Award—the Defense Department’s highest honor, holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, 2013 (“Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?,” *Ask CFR Experts*—a Council on Foreign Relations blog, Question submitted by Josh Wartel from Lake Braddock Secondary School, September 9th, Available Online at <http://www.cfr.org/china/military-conflict-between-china-united-states-possible-future/p31361?cid=rss-fullfeed-is_a_military_conflict_between-090913>, Accessed 09-12-2013)

Is a military conflict between China and the United States possible in the future?

There is almost never a time when people do not worry about war between major powers. The history here is not a happy one. But there are good reasons to expect a better outcome in the 21st century—as long as both sides are alert and careful.

The stakes are much too high for either Beijing or Washington to expect direct military confrontations. Two-way trade and investment are quite high. China holds almost $1.2 trillion in American debt. By contrast, during the Cold War, the United States had virtually no economic ties with the Soviet Union—and both sides still went out of their way to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation into nuclear war. The nightmare of nuclear war hangs over the Chinese-American relationship today. It is clear neither side wants to come anywhere near this ultimate danger.

None of this is to say that both sides will not continue to build up their military capability. No country is adding to its military punch faster than China. But it is still far behind the United States in usable military capability, that is, force that can be applied effectively and decidedly in various situations. Chinese military strength is limited almost entirely to lands and seas bordering its own territory. The United States is still the only global military power.

And it is difficult to see what Beijing might calculate is worth a war or even the risk of war. It has boundary disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others in the South China Sea, and with Japan up north. Troubles should be expected there, and China will certainly be testing Washington's will in both places. Chinese leaders, however, continue to focus on their nation's economic development, and war would certainly set that back.

#### Even if it does escalate, it won’t go nuclear.

Thim 15 — Michal Thim, Research Fellow at the Association for International Affairs (Prague), Member of CIMSEC—The Center for International Maritime Security, Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, Postgraduate Student in Taiwan Studies at the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham, previously a Graduate Student in Asia-Pacific Studies and Taiwan Studies at National Chengchi University, holds an M.A. in Political Science from Charles University in Prague, 2015 (“On Taiwan, Hard Choices, and Determinism,” *Taiwan In Perspective*—a blog, April 19th, Available Online at <https://taiwan-in-perspective.com/2015/04/19/on-taiwan-hard-choices-and-determinism/>, Accessed 07-10-2016)

Firstly, White inevitably addresses the issue of potential U.S. military assistance to Taiwan in the case of Chinese attack:

Even more worryingly, this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself – far worse than reunification, in fact.

The last sentence is just horrible. It could very well read like this: “Please, everyone who just happen to be subject of territorial desire of a stronger state, do us good and surrender already, obviously it is better for you anyway. Sincerely yours, concerned third party.” Now somehow I can’t understand why White’s compatriots were so stubbornly rejecting to become part of the glorious Japanese empire more than 60 years ago. It must be some exception from the rule, I suppose.

That is not what puzzles me though. Instead it is the other claim. Why so many people assume that potential conflict between China and the U.S. has nuclear potential? For one, I do not think it does. Neither territory of the two nuclear weapon-armed actors would be subject to an invasion from the other side, nor would either of them face total defeat threatening the very existence of one’s statehood. Granted, losing would be hard hit for either of the two (and Taiwan), but it would not be as nearly as bad as mutual nuclear holocaust. Live to fight another day is in this scenario always better option, Taiwan’s importance notwithstanding.

### A2 NPT Resilient

#### The umbrella alone is insufficient – it fails to resolve *lower-level provocations* which is the cause of South Korean anxiety

Rapp-Hooper 13 (Mira Rapp-Hooper, fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, written while she was pursuing her doctoral in Columbia, 3/2/2013, “Not a Good Idea: American Nukes in South Korea”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/not-a-good-idea-american-nukes-in-south-korea/?allpages=yes)

Following North Korea’s most recent nuclear test on February 12th, conservative officials in the South have resumed calls for the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. “The only way to defend our survival would be to maintain a balance of terror that confronts nuclear with nuclear,” said Representative Shim Jae-cheol at a National Assembly meeting, before recommending the redeployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) to his country. Meanwhile other officials have recommended an independent South Korean nuclear deterrent. These calls from ROK conservatives may not come as a surprise: Similar exhortations followed previous North Korean provocations. What’s more, this latest iteration of North Korean bellicosity has included some especially ominous rhetoric. DPRK officials have suggested that U.S.-ROK joint military exercises could ignite a war, and that South Korea may meet its “final destruction.” There is no question that the South has reason to be anxious regarding its security. But this latest round of security challenges on the peninsula begs the question: Why do some South Koreans want tactical nuclear weapons, and what would they do for ROK security? Specifically, how would they reinforce the U.S. nuclear umbrella? American tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula in late 1991 as part of President George H.W. Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiative. Shortly thereafter, the ROK and DPRK signed a Joint Declaration of commitment to a nuclear weapons-free Korea. The North’s subsequent development of a small, independent nuclear stockpile upended that agreement. The DPRK also maintains that the ROK’s continued alliance with the United States violates the pact, as the South remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If the South were the victim of a major attack, the United States could defend it using its strategic nuclear arsenal of homeland-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),bombers and sea-based submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It is not surprising that many in the South feel that they have gotten short shrift as the North has continued to develop nuclear and missile capabilities: After agreeing to the withdrawal of U.S. NSNWs, they now face a nuclear-armed, highly-provocative neighbor to the North. And despite the fact that the United States goes to great lengths to assure the ROK of its continued conventional and nuclear commitment to its security, there is skepticism in the South as to whether American nuclear assistance would be forthcoming in a time of crisis. In a 2012 Asan Institute survey, only 48 percent of South Korean respondents said that they believed the United States would employ its nuclear forces in response to a nuclear strike by the DPRK on South Korea. A significant number of South Koreans, including high-level officials seem to believe that the return of NSNWs would help to fill this perceived strategic gap. One reason for continued South Korean interest in tactical nuclear weapons is their role in so-called “de-coupling.” In any alliance that involves extended nuclear deterrence, there is a fundamental credibility problem: Why would a nuclear state like the United States use those weapons on behalf of South Korea, and invite retaliation on its own homeland? Put differently, why would an American president ever voluntarily trade Washington for Seoul? For the time being, the DPRK probably doesn’t have the missile capabilities to reach the continental United States. If it acquires them, however, and the North actually has the ability to hold U.S. cities at risk, this dilemma could be of even greater concern. Some believe this dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. nuclear umbrella commitments to the ROK relies entirely on homeland and sea-based deterrents. If there were a small number of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula and the ROK was the victim of a DPRK attack, the United States could authorize nuclear use without assuming automatic retaliation against its own cities. This might, in turn, make nuclear use in a crisis more likely, and therefore, the umbrella more credible. Another reason for South Korea’s interest in the return of tactical nuclear weapons is the role that they might play as a bargaining card against the DPRK’s small stockpile. In the many cycles of negotiations that have taken place since the North began its nuclear program, the South has not had as much bargaining leverage as it might have wanted. It retains the option to cut or halt food aid to the North, withholding a “carrot,” but this aid has widespread domestic political support in the ROK. Reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons could serve as a “stick” to be traded away if the DPRK becomes willing to relinquish its own nuclear weapons. The decoupling and bargaining rationales are not merely academic, but have resulted in significant popular support for the return of NSNWs. A February 2013 Asan poll found that 67 percent of respondents supported the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, these sentiments are not just a reaction to the recent DPRK test: A June 2012 poll also found that 69 percent of respondents favored NSNW redeployment. But the question remains: Would tactical nuclear weapons really strengthen the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Extended deterrence, as conceived of throughout the Cold War, aims to prevent large-scale conventional or nuclear attacks on allies with the threat to use nuclear weapons on their behalf. Despite the inherent credibility problem, American extended deterrence appears to have a strong empirical record: No U.S. ally that holds a formal security guarantee has ever been the victim of a major attack. One cannot argue that this is directly causal, as successful deterrence is very difficult to measure. Nonetheless, the basic point holds that extended deterrence aims to protect allies’ vital interests, and those do not appear to be under assault. The problem, at present, is not that the American commitment to fight a major war on behalf of an ally has weakened. Rather, it is that U.S. allies like South Korea have become subject to lower-level provocations that are very difficult to deter indeed. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is not necessarily designed to forestall nuclear weapons testing, or to dissuade the sinking of a frigate or the shelling of offshore islands. Yet when these acts occur, South Koreans feel fundamentally insecure. This problem is not exclusive to the U.S.-ROK alliance. The recent Sino-Japanese standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has also raised the question of how extended deterrence functions at lower levels of escalation. It remains highly unlikely that the United States will ever have to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons on South Korea’s behalf. China’s rise and North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile developments make it quite probable, however, that lower-level incidents will continue to surface, provoking anxieties from allies who feel that the U.S. umbrella is not water-tight. The return of tactical weapons may make some South Koreans feel that American nuclear use on their behalf is modestly more likely, but it will not solve the puzzle of how to shore up deterrence at lower levels of conflict. South Korean calls for the return of NSNWs should not be dismissed, but taken as a signal that further assurance from the United States is needed. Whether through the recently established U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Policy Committee or other channels, the alliance must make coordination around lower-level threats a top priority. A failure to do so could result in serious alliance divisions when crises do arise, and only exacerbate feelings of insecurity in Seoul. Extended deterrence doubts could also have regional reverberations if they result in a more robust South Korean nuclear program. There are, however, several reasons for optimism: The U.S.-ROK alliance will soon celebrate its 60th anniversary, and has weathered many a storm since its founding. The alliance has maintained cohesion despite several recent challenges, including three DPRK nuclear tests, numerous missile launches, the sinking of the Cheonan, and shelling of Yeonpyeong. At 95 percent, South Korean popular support for the pact could scarcely be higher. In light of these facts, the United States and ROK should commit to finding new and innovative defense and deterrence solutions to deal with lower-level conflict. The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula is a Cold War solution to a 21st century problem.

### A2 Alliance Bad

#### Making enemies is inevitable- the enactment of the aff shouldn't be a question of avoiding all tensions, just the ones with the greatest degree of harm

#### Prioritize the DA- the ROK-US alliance is critical to deter Asian nations from pursuing nuclear arms and instigating nuclear war

#### We control the internal link to backlash- even if there is a risk of conflict on the Asian peninsula in the SQ, they only inflate it through heightened Korean nationalism

#### Prolif undermines effective coop between South Korea and other international actors

Hayes, Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California, and Moon, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University, 15 Peter and Chung-In, “THE WAR THAT MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT” http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/goodby\_shultz\_-\_the\_war\_that\_must\_never\_be\_fought\_-\_scribd.pdf

South Korea would face very high costs were it to move to nuclear armament because it is deeply embedded in a network of multilateral and bilateral treaty commitments and nuclear energy-supply trading networks. South Korea is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and therefore cannot receive, manufacture, or get any assistance to produce nuclear explosive devices or weapons under Article 2. It is also obliged to comply with the safeguard regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose alarm bells will ring loudly the moment that South Korea starts a nuclear weapons program.39 It cannot emulate Israel, which has refused to sign the NPT and is believed to be one of the states with a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Seoul would have to emulate Pyongyang if it pursues nuclear weapons sovereignty. Like the North in 1994, the South would have to leave the NPT using the pretext of emergency. But unlike North Korea, which had almost no external nuclear ties or market relations to lose, South Korea is highly involved in global markets. The ROK’s global reputation is exemplified by South Koreans serving as UN secretary-general and World Bank president. To say the least, it would undermine South Korea’s claim to global middle power leadership as embodied in its hosting of such events as the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit.40

## T/Theory

### A2 Nebel T

### A2 Solvency Advocate Theory

counterinterp – the affirmative must have a card in the 1AC that mentions each of the plan's actors and condemns the use of nuclear power –

solves your offense – the only difference between my interp and theirs is the literal sentence "thus, they should ban nuclear power"

the standard is overlimiting – the interp forces us to have authors with a 3rd grade reading level – obviously if the author discusses

#### We meet – here's a solvency advocate

Hung 13 [Faith Hung and Antoni Slodkowski, "In North Asia, A Growing Crisis of Confidence in Nuclear Power," Scientific American, 8/9/2013] AZ

TAIPEI/TOKYO (Reuters) - A nuclear power plant in Taiwan may have been leaking radioactive water for three years, the government has said, adding to a growing crisis of confidence in North Asia about nuclear safety. Japan is struggling to contain radioactive water pouring out of the Fukushima nuclear plant that was wrecked by a 2011 tsunami. In South Korea, prosecutors are conducting a massive investigation into forged safety certificates and substandard parts at many of its reactors. Nuclear power has long been used as a reliable alternative to fossil fuels in natural resource-starved parts of Asia like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, but the safety worries are forcing a rethink. A plan to build Taiwan's fourth nuclear plant has been held up for years by street protests and a brawl in the legislature over safety issues. Most nuclear plants in Japan remain closed and nine of South Korea's reactors have been shut down, six for maintenance and three to replace cables that were supplied using forged certificates.

## Disads

### A2 Oil Spikes DA

#### No link – the aff countries aren't key to global demand for oil – they have minimal energy consumption

#### No impact

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The idea that a sudden spike in oil prices spells economic doom has influenced America’s foreign policy since at least 1973, when Arab states, upset with Western support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, drastically cut production and halted exports to the United States. The result was a sudden quadrupling in crude prices and a deep global recession. Many Americans still have vivid memories of gas lines stretching for blocks, and of the unemployment, inflation, and general sense of insecurity and panic that followed. Even harder hit were our allies in Europe and Japan, as well as many developing nations. Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.

### A2 Japan Warming

#### Japan is meeting emissions requirements—shifting from coal towards renewables.

Levit 6/17 [Donald; strategist; Economic Calendar; 6/17/16; “Japan Burning Record Amount of Coal Instead of Relying on Nuclear Power”; <http://www.economiccalendar.com/2016/06/17/japan-burning-record-amount-of-coal-instead-of-relying-on-nuclear-power/>; JLB (8/17/16)]

The concern about Japan’s hefty use of coal is that if international agreements to curb the use of coal come with hefty fines and fees to coal users, than Japan’s high use of coal could have a major economic impact on the country over the longer-term. Some of **Japan’s powerful trading houses are cutting** or freezing **coal investments over concerns about the environmental and economic fallout.** Japan recently gave environmental approval to three more coal-fired power plants out of 45 planned. This agreement came even after the country agreed at last year’s UN climate conference to cut carbon emissions by 26% by 2030 from its 2013 levels. **Even though the country has increased coal use, it has promised that it will make its thermal power stations more efficient to meet its global emissions commitments.** **The country is also increasing its use of renewable energy;** **Japan is now the third largest solar power user in the world.**

#### Japan’s business lobby is pushing for renewables—no long term shift to coal, heavily relies on imports.

Brown 6/22 [Lincoln; former News and Program Director for KVEL radio; Oil Price; 6/22/16; “Japan’s Business Lobby Calls For A Shift From Nuclear Power To Renewables”; <http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Japans-Business-Lobby-Calls-For-A-Shift-From-Nuclear-Power-To-Renewables.html>; JLB (8/17/16)]

**Japan must look toward renewable energy** instead of nuclear power for its power needs, **Teruo Asada, vice chairman of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives,** has **said**, since **the chances are slim that Japan will** be able to **return to the levels of nuclear power that existed before** the **Fukushima** accident in 2011. The Abe administration has the goal of using nuclear energy for a fifth of the country’s power needs by 2030. So far, only 42 operable reactors have started operation. Asada stated: **"We have a sense of crisis that Japan will become a laughing stock if we do not encourage renewable power."** Asada also commented that **for the long term**, Japan needs to lower its dependence on nuclear power, predicting that it might not comprise 10 percent of the country’s energy supply. He said that **the association is calling for measures to encourage private investment in renewable energy and public funding for the necessary infrastructure.** Asada’s comments come as legal challenges and public opinion haunt efforts to restart the nuclear plant. Japan’s government and business sector had supported nuclear energy as an alternative to **fossil fuels**, which **must be imported.** Renewable energy accounted for 14.3 percent of the country’s power up to March of this year.

#### Clean coal in Japan solves

AP 14 [Associated Press, "Budget Bill Signed By Governor Matt Mead" 3/5/2014] AZ

Gov. Matt Mead has signed a cooperation agreement between Wyoming and a consortium of Japanese companies to research clean-coal technology, it was announced Tuesday. Mead and Osamu Tsukamoto, president of Japan Coal Energy Center (JCOAL), executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) yesterday committing to cooperation in coal research and development of technologies and coal trade. JCOAL operates under the supervision of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and is supported by more than 120 member coal-related businesses, including Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems, Nippon Steel and Toshiba. “Japan is a leader in clean-coal power. Japan is looking to diversify its coal resources supply chain,” said Governor Mead. “I am excited to partner with JCOAL and their member businesses to developing carbon solutions for the benefit of the world and in exploring ways to ship Wyoming’s coal to Japan. This partnership has great promise for Wyoming.” The MOU covers technical cooperation, research and development, communication and information exchange and facilitating coal exports and sales. The University of Wyoming, the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority and the Wyoming Business Council are the primary agencies that will be working with JCOAL. The agreement does not include any exchange of funds. A copy of the MOU is available on Mead’s website. Mead expects to host a conference in Wyoming within a year to facilitate work between Japanese researchers and researchers from the University of Wyoming’s School of Energy Resources. Wyoming, the largest coal producing state, is looking for ways to keep the state’s coal industry working even as the country moves further toward a low carbon economy. In April, Gov. Mead broke ground on a $21 million carbon test center that is being built next to Basin Electric Power Cooperative’s Dry Fork Station south of Gillette. One of the goals of the new research center would be to find ways to make coal a cleaner burning fuel, reducing its environmental damage, which would help drive demand for exports.

### A2 Japan Econ DA

#### 1. Exportation drives up the Japanese trade surplus- Japan already relies a ton on import dependence and nuclear is insufficient- nonuniques their DAs

Dewit 15 [Andrew Dewit (Andrew DeWit is Professor in Rikkyo University’s School of Policy Studies and an editor of The Asia-Pacific Journal. His recent publications include “Climate Change and the Military Role in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response,” in Paul Bacon and Christopher Hobson (eds) Human Security and Japan’s Triple Disaster (Routledge, 2014), “Japan’s renewable power prospects,” in Jeff Kingston (ed) Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan (Routledge 2013), and (with Kaneko Masaru and Iida Tetsunari) “Fukushima and the Political Economy of Power Policy in Japan” in Jeff Kingston (ed) Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response and Recovery after Japan’s 3/11 (Routledge, 2012). He is lead researcher for a five-year (2010-2015) Japanese-Government funded project on the political economy of the Feed-in Tariff.), 10-7-2015, "Japan’s Bid to Become a World Leader in Renewable Energy," Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-bid-to-become-a-world-leader-in-renewable-energy/5480274>. Asia Pacific Journal, Global Resaerch] NB

So consider where Japan is. The country has just adopted mid-term energy targets that few find credible. It has also done this in the midst of enormous uncertainty on conventional energy supplies, prices, geopolitics and other factors. It bears keeping in mind that Japan is not just the world’s fifth-largest power market, but also the world’s largest importer of LNG, the second largest importer of coal, and the third-largest net importer of oil and oil products.32 Figure 2 on “Changes in Japan’s Power Mix” shows that the country’s import dependence on conventional fuels to produce power greatly increased between 2010 to 2013, when nuclear’s share shrank and LNG’s role ballooned from 29.3 percent of power to 43.2 percent, coal increased from 25 percent to 30.3 percent, and oil and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) more than doubled from 6.6 to 13.7 percent. Virtually all of these fuels are imported, so Japan’s import dependence increased dramatically, from 62 percent in 2010 to 88 percent in 2013. The comparison with the average EU power mix in 2011 is striking, as the EU’s overall dependence on imports is 49 percent.¶ Figure 2 shows that Japan in 2013 was even more import dependent than it was in 1973. That was the year of the first oil shock, which is still such a benchmark for vulnerability among Japanese policymakers that – as noted earlier – the METI emphasizes it in its fiscal and regulatory planning for efficiency and conservation and indeed uses when it produces figures (figure 2 is a direct translation of METI’s work). Admittedly Japan’s power mix in 2013 was less dependent on a single energy source, in contrast to the over 70 percent dependence on oil and LPG in 1973. At the same time, the geopolitical, climate and other risks of using fossil fuels in the present far exceed those of 1973.¶ Indeed, it is hard to exaggerate the scale of contemporary risks. For example, the September 21, 2015 Financial Times warns that current low prices for oil have put as much as USD 1.5 trillion of investment in energy projects in question. This constriction in the infrastructure of supply brings profound risks of dramatic price escalations as early as 2017.33 And in spite of continuing optimism concerning unconventional oil and gas reserves, especially the US “shale revolution,” a growing number of objective and rigorously empirical studies of the actual resource base and costs of production suggest that shale’s important addition to the global supply portfolio is better measured in years than decades.34 Indeed, the shale boom was in large measure driven by a doubling of US high-yield “junk bond” debt to USD 2 trillion, a bubble that appears to be imploding.35 Meanwhile, demand for energy continues to grow: China’s gasoline consumption in July of 2015 was up 17 percent over the previous year.36 One respected expert’s extrapolation of present trends in oil warns that just China and India alone will be “theoretically consuming 100% of global net exports around the year 2032.”37¶ In short, 3-11 and all that has happened since has reduced nuclear to at best a minor role in Japan’s power mix. Certainly nuclear appears incapable of displacing much of Japan’s environmentally damaging, expensive and geopolitically risky reliance on fossil fuels in the power mix. So the real question for LDP policymakers is whether they will allow vested energy interests to dominate investment decisions and income streams in the country’s power economy, its most critical infrastructure. The energy vested interests’ performance during the 2030 “best mix” debate showed that unchecked, their self-interest would turn Japan into an energy- and climate-technology Galapagos while the rest of the world embraces renewable energy and efficiency. This argument is not wishful thinking: on October 2, 2015, the International Energy Agency (IEA) announced that “renewable energy will represent the largest single source of electricity growth over the next five years, driven by falling costs and aggressive expansion in emerging economies.” The IEA believes the coming five years will see renewables provide two-thirds of net additions to global power systems, representing over 700 gigawatts or over twice Japan’s installed power capacity. This forecast suggests that by 2020 renewable power generation will be supplying a volume of electricity “higher than today’s combined electricity demand of China, India and Brazil.”38¶ The budget numbers reviewed above suggest that the LDP’s renewable-energy supporters are determined not to allow vested interests and incrementalism to ruin the country’s fortunes. They are using the Abe regime’s explicit commitment to maximize the share of renewables as an opportunity to use state finance to accelerate the diffusion of renewable energy and efficiency. But they are not doing this willy-nilly. It would seem that the Abe regime and Japan’s energy bureaucracy have also learned important lessons from various experiences, including the Board of Audit of Japan survey noted above. The survey assessed the return on directly subsidized renewable project spending. It found that 63.7% of total spending was devoted to solar, producing only 38.6% of total installed capacity. By contrast, a mere 0.8% of total subsidies spent on geothermal has resulted in projects that (once in operation) will represent 19.5% of installed capacity. For biomass, the return was not as powerful as geothermal. But even then, 25.3% of subsidy spending resulted in 17.6% of total installed capacity. And with both geothermal and biomass, the power output does not depend on the time of day or the weather.39

Trade deficit is the largest economic threat to japan and econ decline in the squo,

Reuters 16 "Record Japan Trade Deficit Highlights Risk Of Economic Stumble". Reuters. N. p., 2016. Web. 18 Sept. 2016.

Japan suffered a record trade deficit in January as growth in exports spurred by a weak yen was far outstripped by a surge in import costs, raising fresh doubts about Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's strategy to spark an economic revival. The trade numbers came on the heels of a survey showing manufacturers' sentiment worsened in February in a sign that businesses were bracing for a chill in demand after a planned sales tax increase takes effect in April. The drumbeat of disappointing data threatens to slam the brakes on the world's third-largest economy barely a year after Abe set about recharging growth with a potent mix of fiscal and monetary stimulus. Exports rose 9.5 percent in January, Ministry of Finance (MOF) data released on Thursday showed, though growth slowed for the third straight month with the effect of the softer yen on shipments outweighed by a substantial rise in import costs. The trade balance came to a deficit of 2.79 trillion yen ($27.30 billion) in January -- a record 19th straight month of shortfalls -- as imports rose 25 percent to a record amount. The ballooning deficit is a reminder that a weak yen alone cannot boost exports as Japanese firms are shifting production abroad, while overseas demand lacks strength needed to offset a blow from the planned sales tax hike. Worryingly, a Reuters poll showed sentiment at Japanese manufacturers slipped in February for the first time in five months and was seen sliding further, a sign the economy may be ill-equipped to cope with the tax hike without further stimulus. Much of Abe's strategy is reliant on companies buying into the view that the economy has enough momentum to break years of stubborn deflation and slack demand, spurring higher wages, consumption and growth. But with the economy having to steer through speed bumps, including from the April tax rise, the Federal Reserve's tapering of its stimulus and stress in emerging markets, businesses remain cautious. Companies surveyed also voiced concern about weak shipments to China and risks from emerging market economies which are key markets for Japanese goods. "It will take time for overall demand to recover," a nonferrous metals company said in the Reuters survey.

#### 3. Begs the case – nuclear power can’t offset oil then dependence A. Legal issues and social rollback B. Earthquakes that kill cost competitivity

#### 4. Renewables can’t expand only because nuclear in the squo

#### 5. DA is nonunique – nuclear was off for 3 years and nothing happened try or die

### A2 Desal

#### Solar desal works in Asia

The Nation 15 [The Nation Pakistan, "Asia’s largest solar desalination plant set up," Eco-Business, 1/8/2015] AZ

Former president and co-chairman of Pakistan People’s Party, Asif Ali Zardari has directed the Sindh government to complete construction of 750 RO plants in various villages of Tharparkar by June this year and thereafter every village should have a RO plant to meet the basic requirement of water of the people of the area. He was addressing the inauguration ceremony of the Desalination Complex in Mithi in Tharparkar on Wednesday. He said today was the most auspicious day in the history of Tharparkar as the Asia’s largest solar desalination plant complex had been completed by the energy department of the provincial government. The plant will provide 8 million litres per day of drinking water in addition to producing one mega watt of electricity, benefitting the people of Mithi city besides other 100 villages. He said the government was committed to providing basic necessities of life to the people of far-flung areas and asked the provincial government to complete the ongoing development projects within stipulated time-frame. Zardari also directed the provincial government to install more tube-wells and promote livestock business by developing institutional mechanisms including special loans and banking facilities for the purpose. He gave these directions during a meeting in the Darbar Hall in Mithi called to discuss the issues of Thar. The meeting was attended by Sindh Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah, provincial ministers, MNAs, MPAs, chief secretary and senior officials of relevant departments and local administration. Zardari’s daughter Bakhtwar Bhutto Zardari was also present in the meeting. He called for establishment of desalination plants in other areas of district Tharparkar particularly Islamkot, Nangarparkar, Diplo and Dahli.

## CP

### A2 Deterrence CP

#### Extended deterrence fails – allies doesn't know fiat is durable and won't believe in the US deterrent – still ensures prolif

### A2 PIC – Must Read

#### Only a universal firewall on these three countries is key – any one of them acquiring a nuclear weapon sparks prolif in burgeoning nuclear powers like Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia – that's Santoro

### A2 Japan PIC

#### Rearmament causes Asian wars and arms race

Kyle Mizokami 15 — writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. 10-31-15 “China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With Nuclear Weapons”, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214>,

It is perhaps China’s greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal. To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact, it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option. At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them. China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime. Japan has no nukes, therefore, if China holds to its word, Japan should be reassured. “If” and “should” being the operative words here. Still, it’s an interesting proposition. Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan, the third largest economy in the world, couldn’t build nukes. What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in. We’ll also set the number of nukes at roughly 300. Japan’s high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses. Land-based missiles Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient. Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or moved around on mobile launchers. This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack. Geography makes land basing even less attractive. Japan’s high population density makes it impossible to find a location for 100 missile silos that would not would invite terrible collateral damage in the event of attack. Even basing them in remote places like the northern Island of Hokkaido would incur needless risk. Mobile launchers would be far too large and heavy to travel Japan’s road network, unless a separate track were built somewhere. Even that would make their positioning more predictable. Another option might be to exploit Japan’s extensive rail network. Strategic bombers Japan could build a wing of stealthy bombers to deliver cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs. Such an aircraft could fly nuclear penetration missions against adversaries, knocking out enemy nuclear weapons, command and control and other counterforce targets. Nuclear bombers would give Japanese strategic warfare planners the flexibility to go after multiple targets or change the targets in mid-flight. Nuclear bombers can be recalled at any point in the mission. A bomber scheme could involve three squadrons of twenty-four bombers each, for a total of seventy-two jets, each the size of an FB-111 strike aircraft. Each bomber would carry four short-range attack missiles, each with a 100 kiloton yield, for a total of 288 nuclear weapons. Geography also makes strategic bombers unlikely. A lightning attack against Japan’s bomber bases could wipe out the entire force on the ground before they are given the order to scramble. If tankers are necessary for the bombers to reach their targets, the destruction of the Japanese tanker force would make the bombers irrelevant. Furthermore, advances in air defense technology could make the bombers dangerously vulnerable. Japan could, like the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command of old, maintain a force of bombers permanently in the air, but that would be expensive and require enough bombers in the air (and aerial tankers) at any one time inflict a punishing blow. The cost and complexity of standing up and maintaining such a force would be prohibitive. Ballistic Missile Submarines This is the most attractive option. Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable platform—as long as at least one were out on patrol at all times. Each Japanese “boomer” could just sail east to the Mid-Pacific to relative safety; any anti-submarine warfare ships and planes sent by Russia or China to hunt it would have to get past Japan itself. Japan could persuade the United States to share submarine, missile and warhead technology with it the way it does with the United Kingdom. Of the three basing schemes, the defensive nature of sea-based deterrent is probably the most likely the United States would agree to help with. Depending on the timeline, Japan could even end up funding certain parts of the Ohio Replacement Program—particularly the missile. In a sea-basing scheme Japan could emulate China, France or the United Kingdom, maintaining a force of five ballistic missile submarines, each equipped with sixteen nuclear-tipped missiles. Each missile would be equipped with four 100 kiloton warheads. The one submarine on patrol at all times would be equipped with sixty-four warheads. There are some drawbacks. Ballistic missile submarines would be more difficult to keep in contact with during a crisis. Finally, if only two out of five submarines are on patrol at any time only 128 warheads would be available. Obviously, under current circumstances, it’s not in anyone’s interests for Japan to have nuclear weapons. Still, it must be recognized that if pushed, it could certainly do so. Although a long ways off, all sides should remember that increasingly strained relations between Japan, China, and Russia could make a bad situation much, much worse.

#### Japan's key – historical resentment lingering from WW2

### A2 SoKo PIC

#### SoKo prolif wrecks global non-prolif regime---triggers nuclear war in every hotspot

Robert Zarate 14 is Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), “America’s Allies and Nuclear Arms: Assessing the Geopolitics of Nonproliferation in Asia,” 5-7-14, <http://www.project2049.net/documents/Zarate_America_Allies_and_Nucl-ear_Arms_Geopolitics_Nonproliferation>

 U.S. allies and security partners in Asia and the Middle East would use America’s diminished military power and geopolitical influence as justification to pursue their own nuclear options. If Washington were perceived as acquiescing in any way to nuclear breakout by Tokyo or Seoul, then we should expect signatories of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT),25 including some U.S. friends, to cite discriminatory doublestandards and even quit the NPT. Likely candidates in the Middle East would include Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf security partners who are already threatened by Iran’s drive to rapid nuclear weaponsmaking capability in violation of the NPT and numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In Asia, candidates would include the region’s many technologically-advanced and technologically-rising nations. Taiwan might be tempted to restart its reversed nuclear bomb-making efforts from the 1970s and 1980s. Australia, birthplace of the SILEX method of laser enrichment that General Electric hopes someday to commercialize,26 may see prudence in developing, at the very least, a latent nuclear weapons-making capability. So might partners like Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. China, Russia, North Korea and perhaps others would likely use Japanese and South Korean nuclear breakout—and any accompanying breakdown in the international nuclear order—as an excuse to proliferate, rather overtly, nuclear weapons-making technologies or nuclear weapons themselves to problematic states. Moreover, the United States could expect Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, if not also India and Pakistan, potentially to ramp up the size and capabilities of their respective nuclear arsenals. In terms of strategic nuclear forces, the regional and global distribution of military power would shift further against America’s advantage. Nuclear war would likely go from being in the background of interstate conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions, to the immediate foreground. In turn, the worsening nuclear dimensions of the international security environment would gravely strain the formal security guarantees of America’s treaty-based bilateral alliances and informal guarantees of its bilateral security partnerships.

### A2 Taiwan PIC

#### Taiwan can proliferate – it's key to global non-proliferation – geography and manufacturing

Kassenova 12 [Togzhan Kassenova (Associate in Nuclear Policy Program at CEIP), "Global Non-Proliferation and the Taiwan Dilemma," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/22/2012] AZ

Taiwan is critical to the global non-proliferation regime for a number of reasons. First, Taiwan is one of the world’s leading producers of dual-use, high-tech materials and technologies. While these materials and technologies are indispensable for many peaceful purposes, some can also benefit WMD programs. For example, Taiwan is the world’s leading producer of semi-conductor material, which is used to produce computers, telephones and radios, but can also be used for nuclear weapons and missile programs. In one example from 2006-2007, the Royal Team Corporation, a Taiwanese trading company, carried out 14 transactions to supply precision machinery workstation computers to North Korea. The equipment, it turned out, was destined for North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapon programs.1 Taiwan can also serve as a transit point for WMD-sensitive transfers. For example, in a case that became public in 2006, Meisho Yoko, a Tokyo-based company, exported freeze-drying equipment that could be used in bio-warfare applications to North Korea. Meisho Yoko exported the equipment via a trading company in Taiwan.2 In another case, the Japanese company, Tokyo Vacuum, exported vacuum pumps, which are controlled items, to North Korea via a Taiwanese company called Transmeritis.3 These cases serve as a reminder that the non-proliferation challenge facing the Taiwanese government is not an abstract one. Taiwan’s geographic location makes it one of the world’s key transit and trans-shipment hubs for commodities, in general. As such, Taiwan deals with high volumes of cargo at its ports, rendering it susceptible to malicious actors that seek to smuggle WMD. Taiwan’s commitment to securing its ports from being used for WMD transfers is an important component of the world’s fight against WMD proliferation. Taiwan is also among the countries that have advanced nuclear power programs. Universally, nuclear power programs have inherent proliferation risks. On the one hand, mastering certain elements of the nuclear fuel production process, such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, gives countries the capability to produce nuclear material for a weapons program;4 on the other hand, peaceful nuclear energy programs rely on material and technology that is by definition dual-use in nature. Although Taiwan currently does not enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel, it does plan to further expand its nuclear energy program and will therefore continue to rely on proliferation-sensitive materials and technologies.

#### Taiwanese prolif causes war with China

Haddick 14 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command  
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 44

Taiwan presents perhaps the least likely, but also the most provocative, case of nuclear weapons potential in the region. In the 1970s and again in the 1980s, Taiwan launched clandestine nuclear fuel reprocessing programs aimed at providing it with its own nuclear deterrent against mainland China. Both times, the United States forced Taiwan to abandon these programs.25 Taiwan has stored spent nuclear fuel at three two-unit nuclear power plants, which could be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium if Taiwan built a facility to do so, as it attempted to do clandestinely in the 1970s and 1980s. Taiwan also possesses the industrial and electronics expertise to assemble a deliverable nuclear weapon. Taiwan is developing an indigenously produced long-range land-attack cruise missile that in theory could be armed with a nuclear warhead. The missile, named Cloud Peak, has a range of 1,200 and possibly 2,000 kilometers and will be mounted on mobile transporters.26 The leadership in Beijing would view a decision by Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons as highly provocative and quite possibly a casus belli. Beijing would likely view such a development as tantamount to a declaration of independence, something that Beijing in the past has stated it would resist with force. Under current circumstances, Taiwan appears to have no interest in this course. But a withdrawal of the U.S. security presence would be a different matter, especially if it led to nuclear and missile races elsewhere in the region. In that event a Taiwanese nuclear program could go from being a highly remote case to perhaps the most likely path to war in the region.

#### Extinction

Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” *The Diplomat*, August 11th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/>, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Possible Scenario

While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.

If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation.

In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.

It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.

In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.

China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.

Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.

Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons.

Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.

China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.

Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan.

China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.

## Kritiks

### A2 "Knowing China" Link

#### Our knowledge of China is accurate—their authors have flawed information

Chan**,** UCB Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science**,** 04

(Steve, “Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations”, Asian Affairs, Vol 31, No. 3 (Fall, 2004), 10/17/12, atl)

**Rationalist interpretations do not imply that people are omnipotent in their ability to procure and process information.** We know all too well that people are subject to a variety of cognitive and perceptual errors (for example, Jervis 1976; Levy 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1977). This recognition of limits to rationality, however, hardly warrants general attributions of naiveté , even stupidity, to government leaders. On the contrary, **it seems sensible to start from the premise that officials know their counterparts far better than scholars may wish to acknowledge. Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, for instance, invest enormous time, effort, and resources in trying to gain an accurate understanding of each other. Academics have a hard time claiming any special insight or unique source of wisdom, whether it is based on mastery of the other side's language, intimate familiarity with its culture, or access to timely and sensitive information with restricted distribution**. If anything**, they are usually at a considerable disadvantage on these scores when compared to diplomats, intelligence analysts, and even journalists and business people. Indeed, academics in fields such as history and political science typically operate in the realm of common knowledge, outdated information, and mundane data**. **This confession in turn implies that at least for some of us, our individual and collective forte lies with the analysis of persistent empirical patterns and the formulation of general models of foreign policy conduct**.

#### Assuming that China’s intentions and perceptions are unknowable makes conflict inevitable—only knowledge about China solves.

Gries 9 [Peter Hays Gries is the Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair and Director of the Institute for U.S.-China Issues at the University of Oklahoma. His many publications include China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (University of California Press, 2004).. "Problems of Misperception in US-China Relations." Orbis 53.2 (2009): 220-232.] 7/25/2016

Political party affiliation has a similar impact. Overall, Republicans held much more negative views of China and preferred tougher China policies than did Democrats. Furthermore, using multiple regressions we were able to control for alternative explanations such as education/income, gender, and age, finding that while these variables had some impact on American views of China, their impact was negligible compared to the impact of political ideology. Political ideology, in short, has a clear impact on the ways that Americans perceive China, likely compensating for a lack of knowledge about China.

Misperception in international relations theory

Mainstream international relations theory largely dismisses the possibility of ever understanding the role of perceptions and intentions in international affairs. For instance, ‘‘offensive realists’’ like John Mearsheimer contend that since there is no way to know the intentions that drive other states, the only thing a rational state can do is to build up its military capabilities and prepare for the worst.17 Thus according to Mearsheimer, the ‘‘tragedy of world politics’’ is that conflict is inevitable because other state’s intentions and views are unknowable. On the contrary, I believe that one tragedy of world politics is the failure of scholars and diplomats alike to systematically seek understanding of how others view the world, allowing misperceptions and conflicts to fester. As Robert Jervis argued in his 1976 classic, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, ‘‘Perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand.’’18 I believe that the survey and experimental research presented above demonstrate that the scientific study of patterns of misperception is not only possible, but is urgently needed.

The challenges of studying perception and misperception in U.S.- China relations are daunting, but they must be overcome if we are to avoid another U.S.-China conflict. China and the United States fought twice in the latter half of the twentieth century, and the United States could easily be dragged into another conflict involving either China and Taiwan or China and Japan. While that probability is low, the stakes are too high to simply cover our eyes and hope for the best.

### A2 Pan K

#### Pan is reductionist and the alt fails

Jones 14

David Martin Jones, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis Online

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, **Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state**, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, **Pan claims** that **such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves**, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). **Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality** for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). **This is a large claim.**

**Interestingly**, **Pan fails to note** **that after the Tiananmen incident** in 1989, **Chinese new left scholarship** also **embraced Said’s critique** of Orientalism in order **to reinforce** both **the party state and** a **burgeoning** sense of **Chinese nationalism**. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with **the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China**. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18).

**Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the** 19**90s**, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young **Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’** (2008: 125). **Paradoxically, these scholars**, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), **had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West** (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). **This approach**, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), **deconstructed, via Said** and Foucault, **Western narratives about China**. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values **and saw postmodern** critical **theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights** and intellectual property.

**It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening**, Occidentalist **lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read.** Simply put, **Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and**, **Pan asserts**, **tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via** an **analysis**, in Chapter 5, **of the self-fulfilling prophecy** of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, **Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive** and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). **This latter point, however, is one** that Australian **realists** like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, **have made consistently since the late** 19**90s.** In other words, **not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario adv anced by recent US administrations.**

**Pan’s** subsequent **argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment** and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm **is**, also, somewhat **misleading**. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). **To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis** in order **to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’** (132) with China **is** somewhat **reductionist**. **Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves** from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself’ (157) **might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of** what Brady terms **China’s thought managers** (Brady: 6).

### A2 Security K

#### 1. Framework – the debate should center on whether the action of the plan is good or not – that's key to engagement with the topic– pure focus on reps moots 1ac offense and shifts the debate on an unpredictable basis since there are an infinite number of assumptions they could criticize – *at worst, you should let us weigh the aff against the K – that preserves the benefits of both critical education and policy focus by including both*

#### 2. Judge choice – you should allow the aff to kick advantages and force the neg to only get links to the advantage we go for – ensures focused debates by allowing the aff to collapse to one advantage in the last speech rather than shallow discussion of every issue

#### 3. No impact – reps don’t shape reality in the China debate

Goddard ’15 Stacie E. Goddard is the Jane Bishop. Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Ronald R. Krebs is Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duck of Minerva, September 18, 2015, “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can”, <http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html>)

\* modified for ableist language

But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others ~~fall on deaf ears~~ [are ignored]. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s ~~silence on~~ [disregard of] the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue.

#### 4. Threats real – strong incentives against inflation

Ravenal 9 [(earl, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget) “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### 5. Extinction outweighs –

1. reversibility – humanity is ended forever
2. future generations

#### 6. No endless war

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, [http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf" \t "_blank))

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

#### 7. Alt doesn't solve the case – realism is inevitable since states don't know each other's intentions – individual orientation towards violence doesn't deny that states desire to protect themselves

#### 8. Perm do both – net benefit is threats real

#### 9. Perm do the aff and the alt in other instances

#### 10. No root cause of war – we have to address the circumstances that allow underlying aggressions to be expressed

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.

#### 11. Finding one underlying explanation that universally motivates Asian actors is exactly the reductionist/orientialist approach to IR they critique – it ignores contingent circumstances in favor of one-size-fits-all assumptions about their behavior and motivations to explain their actions

## WIP

### cuts

#### Chinese modernization and Russian aggression drive allied prolif

Sempa 16 [Francis P. Sempa (author of *Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Transaction Books) and *America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics and War* (University Press of America). He is also a contributor to *Population Decline and the Remaking of Great Power Politics* (Potomac Books). He has written on historical and foreign policy topics for Joint Force Quarterly, American Diplomacy, the University Bookman, The Claremont Review of Books, The Diplomat, Strategic Review, the Washington Times and other publications. He is an attorney, an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University, and a contributing editor to American Diplomacy), "Nuclear Instability in the Asia-Pacific Region?," The Diplomat, 2/7/2016] AZ

Other developments in this area provide additional reasons for concern. Russia and Pakistan have doctrinally indicated that they will use nuclear weapons first against opponents’ conventional forces. China is reconsidering its declared “no first use” policy. Russia, China, and North Korea have constructed or expanded underground nuclear complexes to both hide and protect nuclear forces. Twenty-four nations have acquired ballistic missile systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Although much has been written about China’s rise as a global power and potential peer competitor to the United States, less attention has been paid to China’s growing nuclear arsenal and capabilities. Sokolski notes China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear-capable missiles; its production of sufficient weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to make as many as 1200 nuclear weapons; its development and deployment of ballistic missile submarines; its construction and deployment of the DF-41 ICBM; its deployment of multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs) on the DF-5 missiles; and its increased uranium enrichment capacity, which will enable China to build more than five hundred nuclear weapons per year by the year 2020. These trends threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the U.S. extended nuclear umbrella to Japan and South Korea, and cast doubts on America’s ability to protect Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and other allies in the region. That, in turn, could lead Japan and South Korea, and perhaps other vulnerable countries, to seek their own nuclear deterrent. “These trends,” Sokolski writes, “invite disorder. How much depends on how well the United States, Russia, China, and other key states deal with them.” Sokolski recommends three broad approaches to reverse these trends: 1. Reassess and clarify China’s nuclear capabilities and shift nonproliferation and arms control efforts to the Asia-Pacific region. 2. Nuclear supplier states must adopt tougher nonproliferation standards and insist on better international safeguards related to the transfer of “peaceful” nuclear technology. 3. Be more proactive in anticipating and preventing nuclear proliferation developments. Above all, those countries that seek to improve nuclear stability must avoid the pitfalls of diplomacy by inattention and repeated downplaying of nuclear risks that undermined lengthy but unsuccessful nonproliferation efforts with North Korea and Iran. Adding nuclear instability to a region already beset by geopolitical rivalries and flashpoints is a recipe for catastrophe.

#### cp – just ban it in japan

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, when many Japanese questioned the merits of nuclear power, former defence minister Shigeru Ishiba advocated keeping the nuclear fuel cycle in order to maintain ‘technical deterrence’. The accumulation of 47 tonnes of currently unusable plutonium is due largely to bureaucratic inertia and poor bets on technology advances, not because Japan thought it might need to be the first nation to use reactor-grade plutonium for weapons. But even though the main reason was for energy security, the reprocessing technology as well as uranium enrichment were developed partly with a hedging strategy in mind. In turn, Japan’s possession of sensitive fuel-cycle technologies fanned South Korean interest in plutonium reprocessing of its own. An updated nuclear cooperation agreement with the US in 2015 put off for six more years Seoul’s quest for a form of this technology, called pyroprocessing, which is only slightly less of a proliferation concern. Japan’s upcoming decision to start reprocessing at Rokkasho will fan popular resentment over unequal treatment. Japan could make a great contribution to global non-proliferation by abandoning reprocessing.

#### cp – engage in talks with North Korea to remove nukes and cap arms – solves japan and SoKo prolif

Two final considerations are warranted concerning the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, North Korea cannot be accepted as a nuclear-armed state. Its international interlocutors must instead continue always to insist on denuclearisation and to mean it. Appearing to acquiesce in de facto nuclear status for the North would fan impulses in the ROK to seek a nuclear equaliser. While insisting on rollback, however, efforts must simultaneously be made to cap North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, through a combination of the kind of sanctions, engagement and deterrence policies that served to stem Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Restraining North Korea will also reduce the incentive for South Korea and Japan to seek nuclear weapons. Secondly, in the event of the wild-card scenario of North Korean collapse, it will be imperative to ensure that all of Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons infrastructure is removed or destroyed. The nuclear weapons scientists must then be re-employed in civilian capacities, as was done with former Soviet weapons scientists. Any unified Korean state that emerges should leave no doubt of its non-nuclear posture. Firm adherence to the NPT by a unified Korea combined with US partnership would obviate what otherwise could be the strongest motivation for Japan to increase its nuclear hedging.

#### A2 taiwanese prolif – no security motive and too many checks

Kassenova 12 [Togzhan Kassenova (Associate in Nuclear Policy Program at CEIP), "Global Non-Proliferation and the Taiwan Dilemma," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/22/2012] AZ

THE TAIWAN WAY

Since Taiwan is outside of the global non-proliferation regime, Taipei’s unilateral policies, motivations and actions in the non-proliferation field are paramount. There are several key drivers that influence Taiwan’s choices in this regard. First, while the international community cannot technically hold Taiwan accountable to the treaties and regimes to which it is not party, it does expect and pressure Taiwan to adhere to globally accepted non-proliferation norms. The United States, for example, has played a major role in the trajectory of Taiwan’s nuclear policy. The US government heavily influenced Taiwan’s decision to abandon a nuclear weapons program that it attempted to begin twice, in the 1950s and the 1980s. The US has also encouraged and assisted Taiwan with developing its strategic trade control system.8

Another dimension of Taiwan’s non-proliferation policy is economics-driven. Taipei realizes that its trade in high-tech dual-use goods depends heavily on whether it is perceived as a reliable actor. Legislation of some of Taiwan’s key trade partners — the US and Japan — specifically addresses the question of a state’s non-proliferation record. US legislation makes it difficult and on occasion impossible for US companies to engage in trade with actors with a poor non- proliferation record.9 Japanese strategic trade-control legislation imposes varying levels of export-control requirements depending on security concerns and the stringency of the importing country’s export control system.10

Finally, Taiwan’s non-proliferation policy is driven by its desire to be a part of the international community. While being formally outside all international arrangements that require statehood, Taiwan aims to adhere to global non-proliferation norms. Most noticeably, Taiwan’s non-proliferation policy manifests itself in the strategic trade control system. Despite not being a member of any multilateral export control regimes, Taiwan chose to incorporate items controlled by all four MECRs in its national control list. In essence, Taiwan voluntarily adheres to rules guiding trade in dual-use goods and technologies. The Taiwanese government requires traders to seek an export-import license before engaging in transactions that involve items listed on Taiwan’s national control list. More importantly, Taiwanese legislation established a “catch-all” provision that requires traders to apply for an export-import license for items that do not appear on the national control list but might be used for WMD purposes. This allows the government to throw an even wider net over products that might lead to proliferation.

In another gesture demonstrating Taiwan’s desire to follow international norms, Taipei established stricter non-proliferation controls with regards to North Korea and Iran. Taipei developed a “Sensitive Commodity List” that includes a number of items that are controlled by the government if destined for these two countries.

Given Taiwan’s important role in world trade, it is critical that two out of four of its ports participate in US-led non-proliferation initiatives. Kaohsiung and Keelung ports are members of the Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI participating ports conduct screening of high-risk cargo before its departure to the US. Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s largest and the world’s 12th largest port, also participates in the Megaports Initiative. That initiative assists with strengthening capabilities of the world’s largest ports to deter, detect and interdict illicit radioactive and nuclear cargo.